# Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Western Europe



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# Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Western Europe

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with

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# Promoting human security: from concept to action

During the last decade, human security has become a central concern to many countries, institutions and social actors searching for innovative ways and means of tackling the many non-military threats to peace and security. Indeed, human security underlines the complex links, often ignored or underestimated, between disarmament, human rights and development. Today, in an increasingly globalized world, the most pernicious threats to human security emanate from the conditions that give rise to genocide, civil war, human rights violations, global epidemics, environmental degradation, forced and slave labour, and malnutrition. All the current studies on security thus have to integrate the human dimension of security.

Thus, since the publication of the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 *Human Development Report* on new dimensions of human security, major efforts have been undertaken to refine the very concept of human security through research and expert meetings, to put human security at the core of the political agenda, at both national and regional levels and, most important of all, to engage in innovative action in the field to respond to the needs and concerns of the most vulnerable populations. Two landmarks in this process were the creation of the Human Security Network in 1999, made up of fourteen countries from all regions, which holds ministerial meetings every year; and the publication of the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, which has called for a global initiative to promote human security.

UNESCO has been closely associated with these efforts from the outset, in particular in the framework of its action aimed

at promoting a culture of peace. Thus, as of 1994, the Organization launched a series of regional and national projects relating to the promotion of a new concept of security, ensuring the participation of regional, national and local institutions, and involving a wide array of actors, including the armed forces, in Central America and Africa.

On the basis of the experience acquired through the implementation of those projects, human security became a central concern for the Organization as a whole. A plan of action for the promotion of human security at the regional level was adopted in 2000, as a result of the deliberations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on the theme 'What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?', held at UNESCO Headquarters; and in 2002 human security became one of the Organization's twelve strategic objectives as reflected in its *Medium-Term Strategy for 2002–2007*. This strategic objective is closely linked to UNESCO's contribution to the eradication of poverty, in particular extreme poverty, to the promotion of human rights, as well as to its action in the field of natural sciences, in particular regarding the prevention of conflicts relating to the use of water resources.

The choice of adopting regional approaches to human security has been most fruitful to date. In Africa, UNESCO, in close cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies of South Africa, has initiated action aiming at the formulation of a regional human security agenda, addressing conflict prevention and many of the issues raised in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative, which UNESCO has fully supported from its inception. In Latin America, cooperation with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Chile in 2001, 2003 and 2005 led to important discussions of human security issues in the region, and to the formulation of policy recommendations that have been submitted to the ministerial meetings of the Human Security Network and to regional intergovernmental meetings on

hemispheric security. In East Asia, building on important progress made by subregional academic and political institutions, UNESCO, in collaboration with the Korean National Commission for UNESCO and Korea University, organized the 2003 meeting on Human Security in East Asia, whose results were widely disseminated. In March 2005, UNESCO and the Regional Human Security Center in Amman (Jordan) jointly organized the International Conference on Human Security in the Arab States. UNESCO developed similar projects in Central Asia, in cooperation with the OSCE Academy, in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), in September 2005, and in South-East Asia, in collaboration with ASEAN, in Jakarta (Indonesia), in October 2006. After a workshop on Human Security in Europe: Perspectives East and West, organized at UNESCO by the Center for Peace and Human Security in Paris, in June 2006, the cycle of regional consultations was concluded in Africa in March 2007.

With a view to opening new perspectives for focused research, adequate training, preparation of pilot projects, and to further consolidate public policy and public awareness on human security issues, UNESCO has launched a series of publications: *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks*. These emphasize three important elements in order to translate the concept of human security into action: (a) the need to have a *solid ethical foundation*, based on shared values, leading to the commitment to protect human dignity which lies at the very core of human security; (b) buttressing that ethical dimension by *placing existing and new normative instruments at the service of human security*, in particular by ensuring the full implementation of instruments relating to the protection of human rights; and (c) the need to reinforce the education and training component by better articulating and giving enhanced coherence to all ongoing efforts, focusing on issues such as *education for peace and sustainable development, training in human rights* and *enlarging the democratic agenda to human security issues*.

We hope that this series – each publication focusing on a specific region – will contribute to laying the foundations of an in-depth and sustained action for the promotion of human security, in which the individual has a key role to play.

*Moufida Goucha*

# Introduction

A new kind of precariousness is touching Europe. The robust structures of social support that had become a commonplace in the post-war European welfare state are being increasingly challenged in almost invisible ways. The society-based guarantees of industrial late modernity are gradually giving over to more economic, political, social, cultural and even moral vulnerability. Although Europeans still hold fast to the basic ideas of security in terms of classical principles of economic and social welfare, these principles map less and less on to the globalized reality that shapes European lives.

The explanations for this evolution are many and discordant. Globalization in its various forms, the onslaught of the knowledge society and the mutation from a production to a service economy are certainly central factors. These changes bring with them the emergence of new forms of identity at odds with traditional social and political systems that have failed to account for their human sides. Traditional territorial organization of Western European society has metamorphosed by migration within, into and out of Europe[1]. New forms of poverty, traversing conventional class lines, threaten. New forms of work and new forms of cultural organization lead to instability in social and cultural positions and are the basis for conventional understanding of European life.

1 For the purposes of this report we understand 'Western Europe' to mean the European Union prior to the 2004 enlargement (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), referred to as the EU.

The purpose of this report is to chart the basic contours of this new vulnerability in terms of *human security*. The inspiration and genealogy of human security are by now well known. Human security is an influential diagnostic concept that emerged from the remnants of the Cold War ideological battlefield. As the attention of the world was released from the logic of bipolar geopolitics, a vast world of development challenges revealed itself. Human security emerged not as a new empirical object, but as a new epistemology. In other words, human security is not so much a new discovery as a new kind of knowledge, a new way of organizing the constellation of facts, values, priorities, views and ideologies.

The objection might be raised that human security is a concept minted for the developing world and thus of little relevance for the European region. This is certainly true according to one specific understanding of the concept. Human security grows out of a development framework, launched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1994), remaining in that optic in the subsequent UN Commission on Human Security publication *Human Security Now* (CHS, 2003). It is a perspective on the world which is opposed to the north and to the gaze of the north, of Europe and of the United States. Thus, in many aspects, the present report is guided by a spirit of adaptation. Human security begins with the *discovery* of precariousness. Human security is both about empirical knowledge and about seeking to engage knowledge. In a way, this report on human security in Western Europe is the ultimate test of the concept. It seeks to contribute to knowledge and impetus for an evolving concept and implicitly argues for its relevance.

The project of a study of human security in Western Europe builds upon the assumptions of the regional approach adopted by UNESCO further to the recommendations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on the theme *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*, and reflected in its series about human

security in the various regions of the world. It thus furthers the conviction that if the concept of human security is at all meaningful, it will be applicable to any region, whether part of the developed or developing world (UNESCO, 2004*a*, 2004*b*, 2005*a*, 2005*b*). This is an important and powerful assumption of the present report. Moreover the report links implicitly to a variety of thematic clarifications contributed by UNESCO studies of the last decade (UNESCO, 1998, 2001*a*, 2001*b*, 2002). These efforts and others have made clear the need for a degree of theoretical openness towards the concept of human security. We believe that although the widely diverse subcategories of human security applied here flow from a supple approach to the main concept, their thrust remains intact. The findings may differ from an application to the developing world, but the result of the project is clearly that the concept has something essential to tell us about the way we live today. Indeed, one theoretical conclusion that may be drawn from the study is that human security in one sense actually lends itself *better* to the *developed world* where mid- or large-scale physical violence is less common as a source of insecurity. Thus, in addition to giving a fresh overview of the parameters of vulnerability in contemporary Europe, the project has provided opportunity to fruitfully test the universal meaningfulness of the very notion of human security.

Although human security has not yet been thematized as a directly Western European question, the concept has been evoked in EU policy circles. In September 2004, an independent panel commissioned by Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and led by political anthropologist Mary Kaldor, produced *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (SGESC, 2004), recommending the integration of human security into the rapidly forming foreign and security policy of the European Union. Yet, instead of studying the question of human security and insecurity in Europe, the so-called 'Barcelona Report' takes its point of departure in the premise that the security of Europeans is associated with the insecurity of non-Europeans. It

thus inscribes its proposed human security doctrine directly in the field of European *external* affairs, building on the claim that through the various functions of globalization, human insecurity will have important consequences for Europeans from outside Europe's borders.

The nature of the political organization of the EU already makes it a special object, a special case of human security. If we understand human security as a concept critical towards the nation-state and its ability to secure the lives of its citizens, then the EU is already, in some sense, a response to a human security need. The nature of the European Union as a supranational entity already challenges the sovereignty of Member States among themselves, giving the individual/nation-state relationship a new form. In addition, the unique character of the EU creates a special sphere of security dynamics between the EU and its neighbours. The concept of human security in Western Europe, as in other parts of the world, necessarily refers to a multifaceted complex of regional issues. Since the effects of human security in Western Europe are a function of both subnational and transnational forces, their study cannot be limited to insecurity within EU borders alone. Thus, while the conventional European security community lays the backdrop for issues of human security within the EU, it does not exhaust them. Human security issues can thus be mapped on four levels, concerning:

(1) individuals in their subnational relations to EU Member States;

(2) individuals in other EU Member States;

(3) individuals in the EU 'near abroad', its neighbours in East and Central Europe, the Russian Federation and North Africa; and

(4) individuals in the EU 'distant abroad', the sphere of the developing world emphasized by the Barcelona Report.

The question of the well-being of individuals in Western Europe will never be far from the question of European integration itself, but it need not be limited to it either.

Which policy choices are necessary in order to ensure human security in Western Europe? The concept tells us very little about what is necessary to meet determined policy goals, especially because, quite often, such goals are not clearly identified or expressed. To take socio-economic security as an example, one usually talks about ensuring a decent standard of living for all individuals, but what 'decent' really means is still an open question. If, on the one hand, this term can be easily sold, for political purposes, to a larger audience obtaining a trouble-free agreement, on the other, 'human security', its broad definition, is of little help to researchers seeking to chart the situation better on the ground.

Most of the principles that shape the human security agenda are already deeply ingrained in European political tradition. Human rights and human dignity are understood, correctly or incorrectly, as the common measure of European culture, explicitly evoked as being among the primary aspirations of European construction, and guaranteed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Yet the discourse of human rights tends to become a catch-all often used by policy-makers to attract public attention, rather than a helpful theoretical tool to develop specific policy actions. Human rights, global and universal in their scope, have always been practised in relation to nation-states, reflecting in part the political organization of the United Nations. The guiding question, both in the present report and elsewhere, is therefore whether the discourse of human security can indeed shed its nationalized pretences.

The aim of this report is to ask in what sense the various domains of ordinary life in Western Europe are made vulnerable to threat in our time. The answer cannot restrict itself to one level of life. Fear, threat and insecurity, the fundamental categories of the human security complex are based on experience, perceptions, memory, emotions. They do not obey a logic of material well-being or physical threat. The scope of human insecurity in Western Europe must therefore include both the most materially determined insecurities and proceed to the most imaginary. It

begins with the most basic economic issues: income, spending and wealth, inquiring into the vulnerabilities to which these expose us. It then turns to the insecurities provoked by the effects of immigration and cultural alienation. It focuses on the insecurities caused by imminent health threats, before turning to the visible and invisible threats to the environment. Finally, it addresses the challenges of liberty, both physical and political, the original domain of the state, supplanted by the European Union.

Social problems, environment threats, health and well-being are vividly under threat in the developed world, though they fall so often under the cover of invisibility. By the same token, we must hasten to see that the existence of analytic concepts such as human security in the North has contributed to keeping them in focus elsewhere. An examination of human security in Western Europe, as it would be in the United States, is a political confrontation with the nature of the concepts at the heart of development studies and engagement.

This underscores one of the paradoxes of the project: Europe is the most completely documented research object imaginable. There is no lack of research or information on Europe. But this is its weakness: unlike a research project on development in which fieldwork and the discovery of new knowledge would be an integral part of the project, and the novelty or innovation of the work, in Europe, there is in a sense *too much* information. 'Research' in Europe about Europe entails a sifting process, a filtering and ultimately exclusionary process. We know what we are, who we are. What we do not yet understand is what it is about us that is relevant. Knowledge is not enough; it is the choice, the interpretation and the use-value of knowledge that matters. The effects of the paradigm problem are felt all the way through such an analysis[2].

2 The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial multi-country survey covering over twenty nations. The first round was in 2002/2003, the second in 2004/2005. The project is funded jointly by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating country, and is designed and carried out to exceptionally high standards by the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, London.

# I

# Socio-economic security

Socio-economic security is a multidimensional concept, which includes various aspects of the individual's private and public life. In extremely general terms, it could be described as an 'equal and durable access to similar and decent living standards', but this definition should in no way be seen as exhaustive. Despite the existence of possible shortcomings (how do we define equal, durable, similar and decent?), this definition has a positive side, in that it adds to a broader explanation of 'human security' – often described as 'freedom from fear, freedom from want' – a material and temporal dimension. In this sense, socio-economic security can be seen as the possibility of providing the individual with the chance of conducting not only a good quality life at a specific moment, but rather, through the entire course of their existence, ensuring that the individual is not forced to seriously worry that their personal conditions might dramatically worsen in the near future. Recent studies have, indeed, continuously reaffirmed the strong link between precariousness and social integration in Europe, which drastically limits the quality of life of European citizens (Gallie and Paugam, 2002).

## 1 Measurements of socio-economic insecurity

One important point, however, must be clarified: *security for whom, from what* and *by which means*? Arguably, the focus should be on security for those in need, from disadvantageous circumstances and by the means of public and social policies. From this starting point, four dimensions that may influence the socio-economic (in)security of an individual can be identified:

(1) an economic dimension in which external conditions may influence the chances an individual has of having access to equal possibilities for their personal realization (i.e. similar GDP per capita among citizens, absence of huge regional differences in accessing the labour market, absence of poverty and income inequality, etc.);

(2) an institutional dimension expressed in terms of an equal access to key positions in institutions, such as in the labour market, but also in the family (i.e. recognition of paid versus unpaid work);

(3) a cultural dimension expressed in terms of an equal access to education, but also the possibility to afford the price of cultural events (i.e. theatre, cinema, concerts, etc.); and

(4) a social dimension concerning the possibility of citizens becoming involved in community and social life.

Whenever a deficiency in each one of these four dimensions occurs, the individual is subjected to new social risks, which are likely to produce negative repercussions on their 'equal and durable access to similar and decent living standards' (ESS, 2004/2005).

Let us consider, for example, a person living in a country with low GDP per capita, high unemployment rates and high levels of poverty and income inequality. Such a person will have greater possibilities in the face of socio-economic insecurity than someone who, by contrast, lives in an economically well-developed country, with low levels of unemployment, poverty and income inequality (economic dimension). Similarly, it is certainly not absurd to conclude that a woman who lives in a country characterized by high levels of gender segregation in the labour market will, at some point, face more socio-economic insecurity than another woman who lives in a country that actively supports a gender equal and employment-friendly society (institutional dimension). To these examples of the industrialization dimension of human insecurity could be added an equal access to education (cultural dimension) or the

possibility not to be excluded by social and community life (social dimension). Even in these cases, an individual with low educational attainments or with lower contacts in their community faces a greater risk of seeing the duration and the extent of their socio-economic security being drastically reduced if compared with an individual who, in contrast, has higher educational attainments and more actively participates in social and community life.

## 2 Statistical contours of socio-economic insecurity in Western Europe

GDP per capita in Western Europe greatly varies from country to country. It is much higher than the EU-15 average: (109 PPS[3]) in Luxembourg (234), but clearly lower in Portugal (73), Greece (81), Spain (97) and Italy (108). If the results of Luxembourg are excluded, Scandinavian countries (124) would score better than Continental and Southern Europe (90). Without Luxembourg, in fact, the average for Continental Europe would fall from 133 to 121. Yet despite differences in life standards, life expectancy among Western European countries is quite homogenous with an average of 76 years for men and 82 years for women. No significant changes among Continental, Scandinavian or Mediterranean countries are observable. In terms of life expectancy, in fact, the exception is represented by Central and Eastern Europe, which has an average of 69 years for men and 77 for women.

Employment rates are higher in the Scandinavian countries (73%) and lower in Continental (66%) and Southern Europe (61%). Exceptions are the United Kingdom (71%) and the Netherlands (74%). Female employment is also higher in the Scandinavian countries (70%) and lower in Continental (59%) and Southern Europe (49%). Interestingly, not only Southern,

3 GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS), 2003 (Eurostat, 2006).

but also Continental European countries seem to show the persistence of a male-breadwinner mentality.

Female unemployment is usually higher than male unemployment, especially in Southern Europe (12.2%), followed by Continental (6.4%) and Scandinavian countries (6.1%). The Mediterranean countries also show higher total unemployment rates (8.9%) than Continental (6.0%) and Scandinavian Europe (6.1%). An exception to the usual better performance of Scandinavian countries is Finland, with an unemployment rate close to 9% for both men and women. On the other hand, the average of Continental countries seems to be artificially lowered by the positive performance of Luxembourg (3.7%), the Netherlands (3.7%), Austria (4.3%) and the United Kingdom (4.9%).

In Western Europe, youth unemployment is usually between two and three times higher than total unemployment rates. It is especially high in Greece (26.8%), Spain (24.6%), France (23.7%), Italy (23.7%) and Finland (21.8%), but no country is an exception. A more detailed look at youth unemployment rates also shows that Continental Europe (13%) scores rather better than Scandinavian countries (14%), while Southern Europe (22%) is far beyond the other two Western European averages.

Long-term unemployment, by contrast, tends not to overcome the total unemployment rates. It is, however, particularly high in Germany (4.5%), Italy (4.9%) and Greece (5.3%). On average, the Scandinavian countries have the lowest rates of long-term unemployment (1.3%), followed by Continental (2.2%) and Southern Europe (4.1%). In the case of Germany, this negative result is not only an indicator of structural problems within the labour market, but also a sign of welfare dependency. It is, however, important to remember that Germany suffers from the so-called 'East Effect', that is, the statistical bias caused by the significantly worse economic situation in the eastern part of the country (Ganßmann, 2004).

Part-time employment is particularly important among women, thus confirming the persistence of gender segregation in the labour market. Female part-time employment is 15% in Southern Europe, 33% in Scandinavian countries and 43% in Continental Europe. In Continental Europe, however, the average is artificially increased by the Netherlands, in which 74% of women work part-time. Despite the positive role that part-time employment can play for women, representing a sort of solution to housewifery, it should not be forgotten that it also inevitably implies the acquisition of lower social security rights (such as insufficient pension contributions), which no country, at the moment, including the Netherlands, is able to ensure to its part-time workers.

Younger generations (25–34 years) usually have higher educational attainments than older generations (between 35 and 44 years). The Mediterranean countries again show the worst results both in terms of younger and older generations, followed by Continental Europe and Scandinavian countries. In Southern Europe, for example, 43% of people between 25 and 34 years have a low educational attainment, while this percentage is 20% in the case of Continental and 12% in Scandinavian Europe.

The 'gender pay gap'[4] is unexpectedly higher in Scandinavia (17) and Continental Europe (18) than in Southern European countries (11). A possible explanation can be given by the lower use that Southern European countries make of partial employment. Nevertheless, this should not lead to the false conclusion that Southern Europe is a more equal and gender-neutral society than Continental and Scandinavian Europe, as employment rates are still much lower in the Mediterranean countries.

Income inequality is higher in the Mediterranean countries (6.0), while it is lower in Continental (4.3) and in Scandinavian

4 Difference between men's and women's average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of men's average gross hourly earnings.

Europe (3.6). Here, it is perhaps interesting to note the presence of higher income inequality in the United Kingdom (5.3) and Ireland (5.1), but it remains questionable whether this represents a sufficient precondition for the inclusion of these countries in the so-called liberal model of welfare capitalism. The analysis of income distribution shows that the UK and Ireland are still relatively close to the distribution of income present in other continental countries, even though they tend to have more poor and rich people at both ends of the income spectrum.

As may be expected, women in Western Europe are more at risk of poverty than men. The poverty rate is 21% in Southern Europe, 16% in Continental Europe and 12% in Scandinavian countries. Also, total poverty rates are higher in the Mediterranean (20%) than in Continental (15%) and Scandinavian countries (11%). As seen in the analysis of income inequality, the UK and Ireland show higher poverty rates than the Continental European average, in terms of both female and male poverty.

In terms of age difference, young (16–24 years) and older generations (65+ years) are also more at risk of poverty than the generations in middle age (between 25 and 64 years) who are usually more active in the labour market. In the Mediterranean countries, for example, poverty among the young (22%) is again higher than in Continental Europe (16%), but, interestingly, lower than in the Scandinavian countries (23%). Poverty among the young is also particularly high in Germany (23%) and the Netherlands (20%), while elderly poverty is extraordinarily high in Southern Europe (26%), but also in Ireland (41%).

Households headed by single parents with dependent children and households headed by single mothers are more at risk of poverty than households headed by those without children. Poverty rates among single parents with children are 35% in Continental Europe, 30% in Southern Europe and 17% in Scandinavian countries. Poverty rates of single women, by contrast, are 37% in Southern Europe, 28% in Scandinavian countries and 27% in Continental Europe. Interestingly, single

persons, single parents with children and single women in Ireland show extremely high poverty rates, at 55%, 54% and 66% respectively.

Finally, welfare institutions play a crucial role in diminishing poverty in Europe. The best performance in poverty reduction is that of the Scandinavian welfare states (–57%), followed by welfare institutions in Continental Europe (–45%), and Southern Europe (–17%). Interestingly, the performance of the German (–35%) and the British (–38%) welfare state does not seem to differ significantly, even though they are usually addressed in the literature as examples of two different welfare regimes (Germany conservative, while UK liberal welfare regime), which tackle poverty in different ways with different outcomes.

## 3 The three Western Europes

Even though the main objective is not to engage in a meaningless ranking exercise, the general conclusion is of the existence of 'three different Western Europes', which tend to be characterized by different stages of socio-economic development. The Scandinavian countries, on average, are more robust than Continental Europe, which, in turn, performs relatively better than Southern Europe. Exceptions to this classification are represented, although not very distinctly, by the United Kingdom and Ireland, which show higher poverty, but also higher employment rates than their partners in Continental Europe. The case of the Netherlands, by contrast, is more ambiguous, since it seems to come closer to the socio-economic conditions present in the Scandinavian countries, especially as far as female employment is concerned.

If the income of all Western European countries were merged together, the proportion of households with less than €6,000 per year would be approximately 6%, 12% between 6 and €12,000, 29% between 12 and €24,000, 24% between 24 and €36,000, 18% between 36 and €60,000, while the

remaining 11% of households would have more than €60,000 per year. These income ranges, more or less similar for all countries, can be translated into:

(1) extreme low-income households (€0–€6,000);
(2) low-income households (€6,000–€12,000);
(3) low-middle-income households (€12,000–€24,000);
(4) medium-income households (€24,000–€36,000);
(5) high-medium-income households (€36,000–€60,000); and
(6) high-income households (€60,000 and more).

It is interesting to note that if income distribution were equally distributed among Western European nations (and if the purchasing power and household composition were the same), only a minority of citizens would find themselves in households below the threshold of €6,000 (6%) or between €6,000 and €12,000 per year (12%). €6,000 per year is a threshold often used by many Western European countries (such as France and Germany) to grant tax exemptions for citizens whose revenues are considered too low to participate in the national taxation system. The majority of people, by contrast, would find themselves in low- and middle-income households (71% would be in households between €12,000 and €60,000), while only a small proportion would be in high-income households (11% with more than €60,000).

The first world of income distribution includes Continental Europe. The main characteristics in this world are relatively low percentages of extreme low-income households (below €6,000 per year), with the majority of citizens living in low-medium (€12,000–€24,000), medium (€24,000–€36,000) and high-medium income households (€36,000–€60,000).

The second world concerns the Scandinavian countries (plus Luxembourg and Switzerland). The main characteristics here are low percentages of extreme low-income households (below €6,000 per year), with the majority situated towards middle-high incomes (€30,000 and €60,000). These

percentages decrease, however, in the case of the very rich. The inclusion of Luxembourg and Switzerland in the family of Scandinavian nations can be explained by the fact that these are relatively small countries, with unusually favourable economic conditions.

The third world involves Southern Europe. Here, the main characteristics are a significant number of extreme low-income households (below €6,000 per year), with a majority of people situated in low (€6,000–€12,000), low-middle (€12,000–€24,000), and middle (€24,000–€36,000) income households.

## 4 Attitudes towards social-economic insecurity

This purely quantitative overview of economic security in Europe must be supplemented by data on the attitudes of Europeans to social and economic issues. The reasons for this are easy to imagine and may include a feeling of insecurity due to the disadvantaged neighbourhoods where low-income citizens are forced to live, the idea of unfair deprivation according to which the well-off are rich because they have probably done something not necessarily 'moral' to acquire this position, or a sensation of powerlessness due to the impossibility of climbing the social ladder, attempts in which other people are evidently more successful. The main hypothesis is clearly confirmed by the results: 71.9% of individuals in extreme low-income households (below €6,000 per year) show low trust in individuals. These percentages drastically diminish with increasing household income.

The second question concerns the satisfaction of individuals with their own life. The question asked of interviewees was: 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?' Again, the expectation is that individuals in lower-income households should also show lower levels of life satisfaction. The income of individuals is, in this case, likely to represent a much more powerful indicator of the

individual's orientations, since it is directly linked to the individuals' own living standards. Unsurprisingly, citizens in lower-income households in Western Europe have lower levels of life satisfaction than people in middle- and high-income households. Citizens in high-income households (€60,000 and more), for example, are nearly twice as satisfied with their lives as those in extreme low-income households (below €6,000) (68.1% against 36.5%).

The next subject analyses the level of satisfaction with democracy. The question asked by the European Social Survey (ESS) interviewers was: 'And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?' A democratic system tends, in fact, to be perceived as beneficial to all members of the community if it is capable of producing an equal distribution of resources and possibilities. Put differently, why should a democracy be desirable if a large proportion of the population is excluded by the benefits that only a minority are granted? Again, citizens in lower-income households are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than citizens in middle- or high-income households. Once more, the citizens that are more unsatisfied are those who fall into the extreme low-income households (below €6,000) category, with 27.6% of extreme low-income citizens demonstrating a low level of satisfaction in comparison with 14.0% of people living in high-income households (€60,000 and more). Similarly, only 17.2% of extreme low-income citizens, in contrast to 29.6% of high-income earners, affirm to be highly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country.

The next question takes into consideration the respondents' happiness with the kind of life they are leading. Respondents were asked: 'Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?' The results find that the rich are not only rich, but are also eight times less unhappy than poor people. In particular, 9.3% of citizens in extreme low-income households

(€6,000) show a low level of happiness with their life against only 1.2% of people in high-income households (€60,000 and more).

The following question concerns the social relations of respondents and it was expressed as follows: 'How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?' As demonstrated by numerous studies, being actively involved in social relations is not only something that increases personal satisfaction in life, but it also increases the chances for successful business. As Granovetter (1985) and Luhmann (1988) have aptly pointed out, the market is not an aseptic environment where individuals rationally buy and sell their labour, but rather a complex system of interpersonal relations, negotiations (and connections, of course), which favour the successful conclusion of business. As Luhmann (1988, p. 8) states: 'every economic action is social action'. Again, people in extreme low-income households (below €6,000) meet socially more rarely than high-income earners (€60,000 and more). In particular, 21.0% of respondents in extreme low-income households meet rarely (no more than once a month) against 9.3% of high-income earners. This means that rich people are not only more satisfied, happier and in better health than poor people, but they also tend to have a better social life.

The final question concerns the subjective health of individuals, which was expressed as: 'How is your health in general? Would you say it is very good, good, fair, bad, or very bad?' As expected, people in extreme low-income households (below €6,000) affirm that their health situation is bad, or very bad, three times more than people in high-income households (€60,000 and more). Interestingly, while a majority still continues to find its health situation fair or good, only 16.8% of people in extreme low-income households, in comparison to 34.9% of people in high-income households, consider their health status to be very good.

# II

# Health security

At the heart of the concept of human security is the notion that a people-centred view of security is not only necessary in ensuring the rights and dignity of the individual, but also in securing national, regional and global stability. In protecting the rights and development of the individual, security can be ensured on a much broader scale. In this respect, health security represents an integral component of human security and is inextricably linked to the other categories that characterize it – that is, economic, food, environmental, personal, community and political securities (UNDP, 1994). As affirmed by the UN Commission on Human Security, good health 'enables people to exercise choice, pursue social opportunities and plan for their future' (CHS, 2003, p. 96) and can thus be considered a prerequisite for sustainable human development and social stability.

This chapter identifies and explores some of the key factors affecting health security in Western Europe, beginning by considering the relationship between health and human security and what a human security approach to health entails. This is followed by a discussion of how risks to health security are to be identified and assessed. Next, a brief overview of the status of health in Europe is undertaken, including a discussion of how health security is experienced on an inequitable scale in the region. The focus of analysis then turns to the threats posed by such diseases as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), food-borne illnesses and avian influenza to health security in Europe. Finally, policy outcomes are addressed.

Human security is characterized as an approach that places the needs of the individual – as opposed to the state – at the heart of security discourse. It encompasses the concepts of human rights and development, employing a framework that stresses the interrelatedness of a number of factors in an individual's well-being. The 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* considers human security to consist of two main components: the first is 'safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression' and the second is 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life' (UNDP, 1994, p. 23).

In this context, good health represents an integral part of human security. At its most basic, health security entails 'the protection against illness, disability and avoidable death' (CHS, 2003, p. 96). However, good health encompasses more than just a physical state of being. According to the Commission on Human Security, health can be defined as 'not just the absence of disease, but as a 'state of complete physical, mental and social well-being'. Health is both objective physical wellness and subjective psychosocial well-being and confidence about the future (CHS, 2003, p. 96). It provides one with the capacity to make choices and exercise options.

Chen and Narasimhan support this definition, arguing that a health approach to insecurity acknowledges both objective and subjective health, subjective insecurity being just as relevant as objective threats. According to them, 'one of the central roles of government and its institutions is to generate public confidence and reduce fear. The foundation of human security, therefore, is to recognize central aspects of public health as a core "global public good"' (2002, p. 12). The 'securitization' of health suggests that 'just as defence and military expenditures are prioritized in the concept of state security, so too should health be prioritized in the concept of human security. Thus, health and human security should be seen as part of a political process to elevate the political priority accorded to health' (Chen, 2004, p. 4). Health security highlights the interrelationship between the

concepts of human security and national security in that in some cases the former is not possible without the latter.

Accordingly, a human security approach to health entails ensuring that health security is a public good equally accessible to all. It consists of two fundamental components: empowerment and protection. Empowerment constitutes strategies that 'would enhance the capacity of individuals and communities to assume responsibility for their own health', while protection comprises strategies that 'would promote the three institutional pillars of society: to prevent, monitor and anticipate health threats' (CHS, 2003, p. 102). Implicit in this approach is the involvement of various sectors of society in negotiating threats to health.

Health security is connected to and informed by social, behavioural, environmental, political and economic factors. All these factors are interlinked and do not act in isolation, raising the question as to how one is to identify and assess risks to health security. At what point does a health problem become a security threat? The World Health Organization defines risk as 'a probability of an adverse outcome, or a factor that raises that probability' (WHO, 2002*b*, p. 9). In addition, the Commission on Human Security identifies four criteria that influence the strength of links between health and human security: (1) the scale of the disease burden in the present and in the future; (2) the urgency for action; (3) the depth and extent of the impact on society; and (4) the interdependencies or 'externalities' that can create ripple effects that extend beyond the particular diseases, persons or locations (CHS, 2003, p. 97). From these criteria, the CHS identifies three broad health challenges that are closely linked to human security: global infectious diseases, poverty-related threats, and violence and crisis.

These criteria allow us to focus on the threats posed by such diseases as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, food-borne illnesses and avian influenza to health security in Western Europe. In each case, an overview of the nature of the threat is provided, including identification of the most vulnerable individuals or communities.

Consideration is then given to the extent to which individuals and communities may be deemed empowered to deal with the health threat identified and the extent to which effective prevention, monitoring and anticipation strategies exist to mitigate and ameliorate threats to health security.

## 1 Inequalities in health security in Europe

Interconnecting social, behavioural, environmental, political and economic factors combine to contribute to an inequitable balance of health security in the region, affecting the physical and psychosocial well-being of individuals disproportionately. Over the course of the twentieth century, Western Europe has seen a rise in living standards and life expectancy at birth, often associated with high levels of prosperity in the region and highly developed social security, public health and health care systems (Mackenbach, 2005, p. 5). According to Eurostat data, between the years 1993 and 2003, life expectancy at birth among the EU-15 has risen from 73.4 years to an estimated value of 76.0 years. Between the same years, infant mortality rates have dropped from a provisional value of 6.4 per 1,000 births, to an estimated value of 4.3. In addition, 88.6% of the population self-identify as having very good, good or fair health. These indicators would suggest that, in a global perspective, Western Europe experiences relatively good health (Eurostat, 2004*a*, 2004*b*, 2005*b*).

However, despite these indicators, Western Europe continues to experience health insecurity. According to the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, the biggest threats to health in industrialized countries constitute diseases of the circulatory system linked to diet and lifestyle, and cancer, which is often associated with environmental factors (UNDP, 1994, p. 27). Indeed, in Western Europe, obesity is on the rise, threatening to become an epidemic in its own right. Of nine European countries surveyed by Eurostat, all witnessed a rise in the percentage of

overweight people between 1998 and 2001. Cancer also remains a major cause of illness and death, the cancer incidence rate per 100,000 persons in the EU-15 totalling 338.83, according to recent Eurostat statistics (Eurostat, 2006*b*, 2006*a*).

What is significant, however, is that these threats to health are generally experienced disproportionately by the poor and marginalized segments of the population. A study conducted for the UK presidency of the EU reveals that people belonging to lower socio-economic groups in Europe are particularly vulnerable to health threats. The study defines socio-economic inequalities in health as 'systematic differences in morbidity or mortality rates between people of higher and lower socio-economic status, as indicated by, for example, level of education, occupational class or income level' (Mackenbach, 2005, p. 5). It reveals that lower socio-economic groups throughout Europe experience higher mortality rates – including a higher risk of mortality due to cardiovascular disease, shorter life expectancy, higher self-assessed morbidity rates, a higher prevalence of most chronic conditions, and a higher prevalence of mental health problems and disability (Mackenbach, 2005). These findings are reiterated by Ghai, who argues that individuals at a financial disadvantage are on average likely to experience more psycho-social stress, which can evolve into 'different forms of psychological and physical ailments including depression, alienation, suicide, high blood pressure, strokes and heart attacks'. Health risks shaped by lifestyle factors, such as obesity and health problems associated with smoking, also tend to be higher among individuals of lower income (Ghai, 1997, p. 10; Mackenbach, 2005).

Although the exact causal nature of the interaction between poverty and other behavioural, environmental and material determinants of health security may be difficult to pinpoint, what is evident is that a correlation exists between socio-economic status and an increased exposure to health threats. According to the Commission on European

Communities, adverse social and environmental factors make healthier life choices more difficult for individuals with low incomes. As a result, they are exposed to more unfavourable material, psychosocial and behavioural risk factors. What this underscores is the importance of an approach to health security that not only focuses on treatment and containment, but also seeks to identify and address the environmental and structural roots of insecurity. This serves to direct focus to those individuals and communities most vulnerable to threat and inevitably has bearing on how policy is approached (European Commission, 1999).

## 2 HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis

Given the close relationship between HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, both diseases are considered together here. While the incidence of one is not a prerequisite for the other, the two are closely associated, HIV being one of the largest individual risk factor for developing TB. Thus, the segments of the population at higher risk of contracting either are the same.

Although the latter half of the 1990s witnessed a relative stabilization of newly reported HIV/AIDS cases in Western Europe, recent trends indicate that this number is beginning to rise, having increased by more than 23% between 2001 and 2004. HIV InSite reports that by the end of 2003, 460,000 to 730,000 adults and children were living with HIV/AIDS in Western Europe, and between 13,000 and 37,000 adults and children were newly infected. TB and *Pneumocystis carinii* pneumonia are the most frequent AIDS diseases in Western Europe and in 2000 the TB rate among people living with HIV/AIDS was estimated at 24%. Eurostat data reveal that between the years of 1992 and 2002, the incidence of TB per 100,000 persons has decreased from 15.8 to 11.6. However, for those living with HIV/AIDS, TB continues to be a risk, especially

considering that multidrug-resistant TB is on the rise (Eurostat, 2005*a*; HIV InSite, 2005; Veen and Godinho, 2006, p. 166).

The increase in HIV/AIDS cases in recent years has primarily been attributed to a rise in heterosexual transmission and transmission among men who have sex with men. UNAIDS reports that in those Western European countries with data for newly diagnosed HIV infections, HIV diagnoses in people who were infected through heterosexual contact increased by 122% between 1997 and 2002. The rise of infections attributable to heterosexual intercourse has also borne witness to an augmentation in the number of women being diagnosed with the virus. According to UNAIDS, from those countries in which data are available, the proportion of women among those newly diagnosed with HIV infection increased from 25% in 1997 to 38% in 2002. In the case of men who have sex with men, HIV diagnoses increased by 22% from 2001 to 2002. Injecting drug use also remains an important component in transmission, more than 10% of newly diagnosed HIV cases in 2002 being attributed to this (HIV InSite, 2005; UNAIDS, 2004).

Those most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS and TB are immigrants and ethnic minorities, sex workers, men who have sex with men, injecting drug users and prisoners. TB specifically tends to be concentrated in large cities that have higher rates of HIV, immigration, homelessness and overcrowding than other areas. Jaap Veen and Joana Godinho argue that poverty also remains an important risk factor in transmitting both diseases. In the case of HIV/AIDS this takes the form of limited knowledge and lack of access to prevention and treatment, while in the case of TB it constitutes poor hygiene, malnutrition and overcrowding. Stigmatization and criminalization are other obstacles faced by high-risk groups such as injecting drug users and sex workers (Hayward et al., 2003, p. 751; Veen and Godinho, 2006, p. 155).

Immigrants from countries with serious HIV/AIDS and TB epidemics have been identified as playing a notable role in

transmitting both viruses in Western Europe, the rise in TB cases between 1985 and 1995 being attributed to an increase in immigrants from affected countries during that time. However, equally important are domestic factors. Srdan Matic argues that the increase in HIV/AIDS cases can be attributed to a combination of 'treatment optimism' and 'prevention fatigue' as well as declines in prevention funding and campaigns, which has contributed to a rise in high-risk behaviour, particularly among men who have sex with men. In addition, despite the accessibility of treatment, an increased number of people living with HIV/AIDS are seeking medical treatment only at advanced stages of infection, largely limiting the beneficial effects of HAART (highly active anti-retroviral therapy) (Matic, 2006, p. 8; Veen and Godinho, 2006, pp. 165–66).

In terms of empowerment and protection against HIV/AIDS and TB, a number of recommendations can be made. While some strategies have contributed to the reduction of HIV/AIDS transmission rates for particular risk groups in Western Europe, such as blood transfusions, mother-to-child transmissions and harm-reduction interventions for injecting drug users, the most effective technology introduced to prevent sexual transmission remains the male condom, which Matic argues has perpetuated the gender inequality in the control of HIV prevention. Furthermore, HAART also remains an imperfect therapy to the extent that it is unable to eradicate the disease from the body. What this points to is a need for further investment in research and development (Matic, 2006, p. 10).

Other key components of control and prevention of both HIV/AIDS and TB remain early diagnosis and treatment, surveillance and monitoring of high-risk groups. Given the close relationship between the two diseases, a key component of reducing the prevalence of TB is the reduction of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. An increase in collaboration between TB and HIV programmes is an important step in this respect and has been acknowledged as such at the European level. Reinvigorated

information dissemination and prevention campaigns, particularly among high-risk communities, are also significant tools for empowerment. Political commitment, awareness-raising and education strategies involving community organizations and other societal actors remain important components in this context. Efforts should continue to be made to ensure free access to diagnostic and treatment services for all segments of the population.

Given the variance of monitoring and surveillance mechanisms among cities and countries in the region, emphasis should also be placed on continuing efforts to harmonize national and regional surveillance mechanisms that target risk groups and respond to new developments, such as the emergence of multidrug resistant TB. This is also significant in terms of anticipation, as the current high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS and TB in Eastern Europe will invariably inform developments in Western Europe.

## 3 Food-borne illness

Despite the fact that cases of food-borne illnesses tend to be underreported, overall instances of food-borne diseases reported to the WHO Surveillance Programme for Control of Food-borne Infections and Intoxications in Europe have increased over the last twenty years, particularly in the case of illnesses caused by *Salmonella* and *Campylobacter*. Indeed, *Salmonella* remains the most frequently reported cause of food-borne illness in the WHO European region and is responsible for around 75% of outbreaks, in spite of the fact that the incidence of salmonellosis has decreased in several Western European countries (WHO, 2002*a*, p. 6; 2003).

Food-borne illnesses are primarily attributed to improper food handling and are thus almost 100% preventable. While food-borne diseases can target indiscriminately, the effect of food-borne illnesses on individuals will vary depending on such factors

as age, health and nutrition status. Individuals of lower socio-economic status have a higher risk of infection, however, due to the fact that they tend to be more likely to suffer from malnutrition and nutrition-related chronic diseases. The WHO attributes this to the fact that low-income households spend less on foods that protect health, such as fruit and vegetables, and more on energy-dense foods with little nutritional value, as they are less costly. In addition, some members of low-income households – most often women – will forego adequate nourishment in order to ensure that the rest of the members are fed. This inevitably has negative health consequences (WHO, 2002*a*, p. 8).

Seasonal migrant farm workers also have a higher risk profile for contracting and transmitting food-borne illnesses. A case study of migrant seasonal workers in Norway revealed that there are no standard set of guidelines for dealing with communicable food-borne illnesses among them. In addition, because they are often not registered as employees and are not fully covered by national health plans, migrant seasonal workers will continue to work when ill given that the financial consequences of not working tend to be severe (Guerin et al., 2005, p. 49).

In anticipating and preventing threats to health posed by food-borne illnesses, a number of recommendations can be made. The WHO argues that policies need to be multisectoral in nature, spanning the areas of transport, planning and food control, and distribution, and integrated at communal, national and regional levels (WHO, 2002*a*, p. 13). In this respect, the international standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission in terms of the development of a risk analysis framework, the surveillance of food-borne diseases and the provision of technical assistance are useful. In addition, the WHO has developed a global food safety strategy to reduce the health and social burden of food-borne disease, which includes such approaches as strengthening surveillance systems, promoting safe new technology, improving

risk assessment and ensuring that public health issues are considered in the Codex Alimentarius (WHO, 2002*a*, p. 16). Efforts should continue to be made across Europe to harmonize national policies in accordance with the Codex Alimentarius and WHO standards. This includes strengthening and coordinating surveillance systems and disseminating information.

Empowerment can also be achieved by focusing more attention on the socio-economic aspects of food security and identifying strategies to reduce the burden of food-borne illness on low-income households. With regard to seasonal migrant workers, steps should be taken to ensure that they are covered by measures focused on improving the rights of migrants in Europe, such as those provided through the European social charter.

## 4 Avian influenza

While the threat of a human influenza pandemic remains largely theoretical at the moment, avian flu remains a formidable risk to health security, particularly from the standpoint of anticipation. Due to the spread of avian influenza and the fact that there have been cases of bird-to-human transmission, the WHO has issued a pandemic alert 'to the effect that a new influenza subtype is causing disease in human beings but is not yet spreading efficiently and sustainably among the human population' (Sandell, 2006).

Avian influenza mainly affects poultry and wild birds and has two main variants: low pathogenic and high pathogenic. It is the highly pathogenic strain of the virus known as H5N1 that is currently spreading throughout the bird populations in Asia, Europe and Africa with mortal consequences. While the H5N1 virus is currently considered to be species-specific, it remains a cause for alarm for two reasons: the first is that cases exist where the virus has been passed on from birds to humans with severe consequences to health, in some cases even resulting in death. These cases have generally been associated with close contact with

dead or sick birds, which is considered the most likely source of exposure. Second, although currently a theoretical risk, the virus could genetically mutate, enabling it to cross the species barrier and in the worst-case scenario, become an airborne virus easily transmitted from one person to another. Thus, the more infected birds there are, the higher the risk of further bird-to-human transmission; hence the importance of containing the disease in birds and preventing its further spread.

In Europe, the existence of the H5N1 virus has already been confirmed in wild bird populations in a number of countries and has the potential to spread further through migratory patterns. The virus also has the capacity to be transmitted by live birds, people and contaminated vehicles and equipment between farms. Outbreaks in backyard flocks pose a heightened risk of infection for humans due to the shared environment between poultry, wild birds and people.

Poverty has the potential to exacerbate the spread of avian influenza and the instances of human infection. The WHO reports that 'in situations where a prime source of food and income cannot be wasted, households frequently consume poultry when deaths or signs of illness appear in flocks' (WHO, 2006). In addition, deaths are not always recognized as being a result of avian influenza and frequent absence of compensation to farmers for destroyed birds may discourage some owners from reporting suspected cases.

Currently, the most important measures for controlling the spread of the disease remain the rapid culling and disposal of infected and exposed birds. Quarantining of infected farms is also significant, as is restricting the movement of poultry. However, little is currently known as to the exact nature of the circumstances that enable bird-to-human transmission and thus more research is required to define these circumstances and identify the possible genetic or immunological factors that might enhance the likelihood of human infection (WHO, 2006).

In terms of monitoring and anticipation, the European Union has acknowledged the importance of addressing the issue at a regional level and has called for the coordination of national pandemic influenza plans, joint evaluation exercises and surveillance and laboratory networking throughout the region (European Commission, 2006). The European Commission has identified as key components of the EU preparedness and response strategy 'the preparation and testing of national plans, surveillance and networking of national reference laboratories to identify the pandemic strain quickly, effective outbreak and management through timely advice, early notification of cases, outbreak assistance and coordination of responses of Member States, and the adequate and timely supply of vaccines and anti-viral drugs' (European Council, 2005). Emphasis has also been placed on the value of coordinating with relevant international and intergovernmental organizations and collaborating closely with veterinary and public health authorities in Member States. A prohibition has also been placed on the import of risky poultry products.

National pandemic preparedness plans are currently being developed throughout countries in Western Europe, but they are at different stages of development. However, almost all countries have functional surveillance systems and vaccination programmes for groups at risk (Ciotti et al., 2005, p. 69).

# III

# Environmental security

Since its initial popularization in the World Commission on Environment and Development report, *Our Common Future* (1987) the concept of environmental security has evolved from being linked to traditional security interests associated with large-scale warfare, to encompassing a much broader definition of security that draws from the insights of ecology. How one identifies and assesses environmental insecurity, however, continues to be debated. Indeed, which environmental problems are to be considered as security issues?

The 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report* defines environmental insecurity as constituting threats posed by 'a combination of the degradation of local ecosystems and that of the global system' (UNDP, 1994, p. 28). Environmental insecurity, then, is a transnational phenomenon and according to the UNDP, encompasses such issues as transboundary pollution, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming associated with the production of greenhouse gases, threats to biological diversity, the destruction of coastal marine habitats, and overfishing (UNDP, 1994, pp. 35–36). All these factors contribute to the degradation of the physical environment on which people depend and can thus affect not only individual health and well-being, but also economic productivity and political instability, thereby threatening human security (Brauch, 2005, p. 76). How such insecurity is experienced, however, differs from region to region. While industrialized nations are active contributors to environmental change, the human and environmental insecurities that arise as a

result are felt more immediately and more profoundly in the South.

Environmental security also has a temporal dimension. Kofi Annan has argued that the concept of human security is based on three building-blocks: freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy environment (United Nations, 2000). Thus, just as environmental threats are experienced disproportionately across space, they also have the potential to be experienced disproportionately across time in that the manner in which environmental security is managed today inevitably affects how it is experienced tomorrow.

An ecological approach to environmental security acknowledges these spatial and temporal dimensions and builds upon the recognition that the environment does not exist as 'the external context of humanity', but rather is inextricably linked to human activities (Dalby, 2006, p. 13). Humans constitute one of many elements in the ecological system and thus contribute to the perpetuation of environmental insecurity just as they are threatened by it. Given the transboundary nature of environmental change and its potential impact on future generations, an ecological approach to environmental security entails considering 'the distant consequences of local actions' (Dalby, 2002, p. 78) and stresses development practices that are sustainable. The European Commission defines environmental security as 'the EU's ability to maintain its development path while avoiding risks of environmental scarcity or resource conflict' (1999, p. 20). In this context, three interrelated problems can be identified as threats to Western European environmental security. These include risks caused by the scarcity of resources, risks posed by air pollution, and risks associated with global climate change. All three threaten not only the productive capacity of the region, but also the health and well-being of its population.

## 1 Resource scarcity

Europe is heavily dependent on natural resources from other parts of the globe and is the world's largest importer of oil and gas, imports accounting for approximately 50% of current energy consumption and expected to rise to about 70% by 2030 (European Council, 2003, p. 6). While resource extraction has decreased in Europe, imports of resources such as fossil fuels and metals have increased, creating a direct correlation between environmental pressures from resource extractions in other parts of the world and European consumption patterns. Indeed, according to the 2005 European Environment Agency (EEA) report on the state of the European environment, Europe is 'disproportionately more responsible for the consumption of global resources than almost any other region' (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 28). In this sense, Western Europe is an active contributor to environmental insecurity outside its borders.

Given the limited population growth in Western Europe, the main driving forces behind resource consumption are economic growth and development patterns (EEA, 2005*c*, p. 5). Production activities from industry and agriculture are two primary contributors to environmental stress, both in terms of consumption and pollution. However, with almost three-quarters of Europe's population living in urban and suburban areas, increasing urbanization is also placing an added stress on the natural environment (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 16). As the average number of persons per household is decreasing, the average household currently uses more energy and water and generates more waste per person than ever before (EEA, 2005*c*, p. 12). Energy consumption is also increasing with the continued growth of the transport and service sectors.

The consumption and pollution of natural resources is closely linked to the loss of biodiversity throughout Europe, which in turn threatens human security. Ecosystems provide the basis for the environment's life-support system and their services

are directly linked to human well-being. In addition to providing the basic materials for life, such as food and shelter, ecosystems support livelihoods, are tied to cultural and spiritual values, and have the capacity to reduce vulnerability to ecological shocks and stress (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 203). Disrupting the balance of the ecosystem has the potential to hinder the regeneration and production of resources in the environment, which are essential not only to the functioning of our societies and economies, but also to human survival.

The threats posed by resource scarcity are no more evident than in the case of current water stress in Europe. While the region has yet to experience severe water shortages, the 2005 EEA report states that the imbalance between supply and demand 'has already created hydrological 'hot spots', where local water abstractions far exceed supply' (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 114). Such overexploitation contributes to the deterioration of water quality and the drying out of water courses (EEA, 2005*c*, p. 26). While considerable progress in water management has been made over the past years, diffuse sources of water pollution, such as runoffs from agriculture, also remain a problem. According to the EEA, high concentrations of hazardous substances, including pesticides and heavy metals, are still found in many European waters (EEA, 2005*c*, p. 28). The risks of continued pollution and overuse of water resources involve the restriction of water use, potentially leading to conflict over water supplies, increased health risks, and potential economic losses (EEA, 1999).

In addition, the loss of biodiversity in the marine and coastal environments poses a threat to not only the cultural and economic well-being of communities, but also their physical security. Continued over-fishing has threatened the survival of a number of small coastal communities dependent on the industry as well as the survival of the resource itself. Current estimates indicate that about one-third of global fish stocks are already overexploited, many stocks now considered to be outside safe biological limits (EEA, 2005*c*, p. 31). As a result, European

fishing fleets have moved into foreign waters to maintain their supplies and meet demand. Furthermore, the depletion of the coastal environment as a result of pollution and socio-economic activity along Europe's coastlines has increased the population's vulnerability to natural disasters. The destruction of mangroves, coral reefs and other natural buffers increases the vulnerability of coastal communities to severe storms and tsunamis. Over the course of the last 900 years, approximately seventy tsunamis have affected the Italian coast (EEA, 2006, p. 71). Combined with the rise of sea levels and the increased chance of extreme weather conditions associated with the processes of global warming, the likelihood of such events occurring is heightened.

## 2 Air pollution

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report identifies air pollution as being a primary environmental security risk in industrialized countries due to its effects on health and the natural environment (UNDP, 1994, p. 29). This is no less the case in Western Europe, where high concentrations of fine particulate matter and ground-level ozone have had ramifications for the health and well-being of its population. It is estimated that approximately 350,000 people died prematurely in the European Union in 2000 due to outdoor air pollution of fine particulate matter alone, corresponding to 'an average loss of life expectancy of about 9 months for every EU citizen' (EEA, 2005*a*, p. 15). In addition, elevated concentrations of ozone have been linked to serious health problems and damage to ecosystems and agricultural crops. Ozone can trigger asthma attacks, aggravate breathing difficulties and can cause death from respiratory and heart diseases. The EEA reports that 'ozone is thought to hasten the deaths of up to 20,000 people in the EU each year' (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 101). Those most vulnerable to the effects of air pollution are individuals already suffering from cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, children, the elderly, and people who

take in a large amount of air while exercising outdoors in polluted environments (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 93). Carcinogens in the environment may also be linked to some forms of cancer and the increased exposure to ultraviolet (UV) radiation as a result of the thinning of the ozone layer accounts for 80%–90% of skin cancer cases (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 104).

The primary contributor to air pollution in Western Europe is the transport sector. Industry remains another source of pollution. While emissions of air pollutants and acidifying gases have been reduced in Europe over the past years, concentrations of these pollutants remain high, continuing to expose populations 'to concentrations that reduce life expectancy, cause premature death and widespread aggravation to health' (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 92).

The EEA reports that 'roughly 10% of European ecosystems still received acid depositions above their critical loads in 2004. This includes 18% of forests in the EU-15 and 35% of forests in the EU-10' (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 97). Thus, air pollution is also closely related to the stresses placed on natural resources and the associated threats to human security. Furthermore, air pollution is directly linked to climate change, the major cause of the accelerating greenhouse effect being carbon dioxide ($CO_2$) and other greenhouse gas emissions (Kimble, 2005, p. 103).

## 3 Climate change

While scientific and political hesitancy to link climate change to specific events existed in the past, scientific consensus now acknowledges that 'carbon loading' of the atmosphere reinforces the greenhouse effect with significant consequences for the environment. Likely impacts include: higher average surface and ocean temperatures; more rapid evaporation and rainfall; more variability and severity in floods and droughts; rising sea levels; an increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events; and an extended range of tropical diseases (Kimble, 2005). Rapid climate change thus represents an added threat to other

environmental issues such as air and water quality, endangered ecosystems and biodiversity, and threats to coastal zones, wetlands, and the stratospheric ozone layer (Dessler and Parson, 2006, pp. 1–2). This holds inevitable implications for human security.

The threats posed by climate change to human health and well-being in Western Europe are most directly demonstrated by the impact that heatwaves and floods have already had in the region. The European heatwave of 2003 is reported to have resulted in more than 35,000 excess deaths, particularly among the elderly (EEA, 2005*a*, p. 34). Human-induced contributions to the atmosphere are considered to have doubled the risk of heat waves of such magnitude in the future, suggesting that the number of excess deaths in Europe due to heat can also be expected to rise over the coming years (Kimble, 2005, p. 105). Increased incidences of flooding have already been documented across Europe, carrying with them adverse physical and psychological human health consequences (Kimble, 2005, p. 13). Temperature increases also raise the risk of being exposed to new infectious diseases and increase the incidence of such disorders as allergies and asthma. Food-borne diseases are also expected to rise, particularly given a decrease in water availability (EEA, 2005*a*, p. 34).

The EEA reports that average global temperatures currently rest at about 0.7°C above pre-industrial levels and are rising faster now than at any other time in modern human society (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 62). The effects of such temperature rises are best illustrated in the case of the Arctic, a sink for $CO_2$. Although a vast proportion of the Arctic region lies outside Europe, there are nevertheless five European nations (six, if we consider the importance of the Russian Federation to Europe) that claim sovereignty over it. Key findings of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report indicate that the region is warming much more quickly than originally thought, with greater impacts than originally predicted (ACIA, 2005). The Arctic is now expected to warm between 4°C and 7°C in the next century, thereby increasing the current rate of sea ice and glacier melt, increasing Arctic

precipitation and reducing seasonal variation, and increasing insect outbreaks, forest fires, and invasion of non-indigenous species. All these factors will affect humans and wildlife alike, including threatening the cultural, economic, and social identity of many Arctic communities (Gabrielsen and Winther, 2004; IP, 2004).

Indeed, the effect of climate change on the health of Arctic communities is already devastatingly clear. Climate variability and global climate change has strongly influenced the transport of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals to the Arctic from non-Arctic sources, such as industry and agriculture in the south, through atmospheric and water transport systems (Gabrielsen et al., 2003). These toxins are transferred to the Arctic at increasing rates as the sea ice melts and the dependence of indigenous populations in the region on traditional diets has left them particularly vulnerable to such transfers. Arctic communities have exhibited high exposures to several POPs and mercury, linked primarily to the consumption of marine species (EEA, 2005*a*, p. 27). There are noticeable trends in increased toxicity in human systems in the Artic regions generally and there has been some evidence to suggest that this may have neurobiological effects on children (EEA, 2005*a*, p. 28). Higher levels of mercury have also been reported in the Russian Arctic and children and pregnant women in Norway are regularly warned against eating particular products containing unprocessed cod livers (Gabrielsen et al., 2003).

## 4 Consequences

A key component of any environmental security strategy is the acknowledgement of the positive role the environment plays in securing human health and well-being and providing opportunities for growth and personal fulfilment. As Khagram, Clark and Raad argue, 'Focusing only on threats overlooks the environmentally related opportunities available to improve human security' (Khagram et al., 2003, p. 113). Rather, emphasis

should be placed on the 'complex interactions between states, human beings and nature' and the environment should be recognized as 'valuable in itself to be secured in its own right' (pp. 120–21). Highlighted here is the central space the concept of sustainability should occupy in the development of policy.

Given the interlinkages between the various factors contributing to environmental insecurity across time and space, an ecological approach to the development of policy necessitates integrated strategies that span not only across sectors, but also across levels of governance. In this regard, the European Union has pursued two strategies for environmental security: '(a) integrating environmental goals into all sectoral policies (Cardiff process), including development, foreign and security policies; and (b) stressing conflict prevention and management in its activities in international organizations (UN, OSCE) and for specific regions' (Brauch, 2005, p. 21). Involving civil society organizations in policy-making processes should be recognized as important components of such strategies.

Equally important is the acknowledgement of Europe's own role in the production and perpetuation of environmental insecurity on a local and global scale. In this vein, the European Commission has called for 'the need to recognise shared but differentiated responsibilities for global environmental threats, so that the EU acknowledges the 'ecological footprint' generated by disproportionate consumption' and has identified a number of principles that should be set out in EU policy. These include the need to change consumption patterns in the region, the need to pursue cooperative approaches to environmental security internationally, and the need to emphasize preventative approaches to environmental management based on the precautionary principle (European Commission, 1999, p. 26).

Furthermore, the EEA has identified three interlinked strategies aimed at furthering environmental and economic progress in Europe:

> stronger and more coherent environmental policy integration, particularly through institutional and financial reform; the internalisation of the real costs of our use of the natural world into market prices which will contribute to the more efficient use of renewable resources, energy and materials; and the more efficient use of renewable and non-renewable resources via measures that stimulate eco-innovation (EEA, 2005*b*, p. 246).

This entails ensuring continued support for eco-friendly research and development. In addition, information dissemination and public-awareness campaigns aimed at encouraging the more sustainable use of the environment should be pursued. Increased and continued collaboration on the international level by means of supporting such initiatives as the Kyoto Protocol should also remain a priority.

# IV

# Migration and security

Migration includes movements of people both within and across national boundaries, internal and international migrants respectively, the latter being the main focus for this report. It extends from short-term movements to permanent emigration – here we use the standard United Nations definition of an international migrant as someone who lives outside their own country continuously for at least one year. This covers those moving out of choice and those who are forced to move, and those who are moving for political, economic, social and environmental reasons, or a combination of these factors. It also includes people at all stages of the migration cycle – for example in transit countries.

Human insecurity can be a cause or a consequence of migration, and particular categories of people tend to be affected. According to the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM, 2005), the primary causes for contemporary international migration are disparities in development, demography and the democratic process. Poverty, population growth and bad governance can all undermine human security and are important reasons why people migrate in the world today. Refugees in particular are defined as people who have been forced to leave their country for fear of persecution or because of conflict. A separate category of concern is internally displaced persons (IDPs), who have been forced to leave their homes for reasons including conflict, development and natural disasters, but have not moved outside their country. More generally, it is the unemployed and underemployed who are most affected by

poverty and a lack of opportunities and therefore most motivated to move.

Some people become insecure while they are on the move. This is particularly the case for irregular migrants. Greater risks are being taken by people trying to move illegally from poorer to richer parts of the world, for example crossing the Mexico-United States border or the Mediterranean from North Africa to Southern Europe. A specific category of irregular migrants for whom this is often the case is the victims of migrant smugglers and human traffickers. Another category of concern in this context are those who become stranded in transit countries.

Certain migrants are also insecure in their destination countries. This is particularly the case of irregular migrants who work illegally and are often subject to exploitation. Often their jobs are dirty, dangerous and difficult, and are jobs that nationals are unwilling to take. The victims of human trafficking are not free to decide on the activities in which they engage. They are often forced into low-paid, insecure and degrading work from which they may find it impossible to escape and for which they receive trivial or no compensation. More generally, many migrants, including those living and working in a regular manner, experience marginalization or discrimination.

Finally, in certain circumstances migration can have a negative impact on the human security of host societies (Kicinger, 2004). It can introduce economic competition and undermine job security for nationals, it can be associated with particular health risks, it can have implications for security where it involves criminal activities, it can affect national identity, and it can be associated with the rise of xenophobia and discrimination. Beyond human security, migration in certain circumstances can also undermine state security, particularly where the entry and stay of irregular immigrants is uncontrolled.

## 1 Current trends in international migration in Western Europe

Although there have been significant improvements in recent years, statistics on international migration in Western Europe are still problematic (Salt, 2005). In particular, it can be difficult to compare different sources – both within and between states – because of different definitions of migration and varying statistical systems. In general, data on migrant stocks in Western Europe are more reliable than those on migration flows. The single biggest gap in the data relates to migrants arriving without authorization and those living and working in an irregular manner. Sometimes they are included in official figures, sometimes not. Different methods are used to estimate their numbers, and many commentators believe that all of them underestimate the true scale of migration flows.

In 2003 (the latest year for which data are available in most countries), there were about 23.5 million foreign nationals residing in Western Europe, representing about 5.5% of the total population (Salt, 2005). The foreign population in Western Europe is spread unevenly – in 2003 about 31% lived in Germany, 14% in France, 12% in the UK and 9% in Italy. Although there have been national variations, for most Western European countries trends in migrant stocks have been fairly stable: only Germany and Ireland have experienced a reduction in recent years, and this has been modest. In Italy and Spain in particular, but also in Austria and the UK, there have been significant rises. In most Western European countries the majority of the foreign national population originates outside the region, and there has been a tendency in several countries towards increasing diversity of origin countries for foreign nationals.

The single largest inflow of migrants into Western Europe in 2003 was about 600,000 in Germany. Inflows to Spain and the UK were next largest. There are fewer data on outflows, but it is estimated that Germany lost about half a million people due to

emigration in 2003 and the UK about 170,000. The combination of inflows and outflows resulted in a net gain of about 950,000 in Western Europe 2003. The largest national gain was some 380,000 in Italy, largely as a result of regularization. The UK was in second place with a net gain of almost a quarter of a million (Salt, 2005).

New migrations have emerged. There were an estimated 63,000 Chinese migrants in Germany in 2001, double the figure in 1993 and ten times that of 1988 (Giese, 2003). 68,000 residence permits were granted to Chinese citizens in Italy in 2001, more than five times the number in 1993 (Ceccagno, 2003). There have also been increasing movements of Albanians – by 2000 133,000 had permits to stay in Italy (Mai and Schwander-Sievers, 2003).

The majority of migrants arriving in Western Europe are labour migrants, although there are significant difficulties in estimating their exact number on either a national or aggregate basis. Germany received by far the largest number of labour migrants in 2003, amounting to over half a million. About 80,000 arrived in the UK and 40,000 in the Netherlands, and in most other Western European countries around 20,000 labour migrants arrived in that year (Salt, 2005). There has been a steady decline in the number of asylum applications in Western Europe, totalling around 325,000 in 2003 compared with 420,000 in 2000. The UK, Germany and France led the list for asylum applications in 2003. As already indicated, there are no accurate data on the scale of irregular migration in Western Europe. Various sources estimate that between 400,000 and 800,000 people enter Western Europe illegally each year (Koser, 2005).

## 2 Insecurity as a cause of migration in Western Europe

With very few individual exceptions, human insecurity is not a cause of migration from Western Europe today. That is unless the concept is stretched far enough to include the small

group of academics, scientists and other specialists who have tended to move to North America for better salaries and a more conducive working environment.

Although the focus of this report is on contemporary Western Europe, it is worth noting that human security has been a cause of migration from this region in recent history. Peasants, dissident soldiers, convicts and orphans, along with workers, moved on a large scale to European colonies of settlement, the dominions and the Americas during the era of European expansion in the nineteenth century. Millions of workers from the stagnant economic regions and repressive political regimes of Northern, Southern as well as Eastern Europe, not to mention the Irish famine, went to the United States from the 1850s until the Great Depression of the 1930s. The displacement of refugees also took place on a significant scale as a result of the Second World War. It is also salutary to note that in the last decade over 1 million people were displaced by conflict from the Balkans, just outside the borders of Western Europe.

Insecurity as a cause of international migration is far more obvious for migrants arriving in Western Europe than those leaving the region. Most of the people displaced from Bosnia and later Kosovo went to Western Europe, particularly Germany. Around 300,000 asylum seekers still arrive in the region each year. It is very difficult to discern who among these asylum seekers can be considered to have moved on the grounds of human security. In 2003, about 8% of cases considered in Western Europe were granted refugee status and a further 8% humanitarian status (Salt, 2005). These are people who have thus been legally acknowledged to be fleeing conflict or persecution, or unable to safely return to their countries of origin. At the same time, it is likely that a good proportion of asylum seekers who do not fulfil the specific criteria of the refugee definition (GCIM, 2005) are nevertheless moving because of economic or environmental factors that would be included under the much broader definition of human security.

It is similarly unclear what proportion of migrants arriving in Western Europe in other categories may have been motivated to migrate because of insecurity. It is certainly likely that proportions of those who arrive in an irregular fashion are fairly desperate and are seeking to improve their lives and those of their families. Why else would they take the risks they do? Again, the answer depends on how widely the definition of human security is applied. It might also apply to educated and qualified migrants who move to Western Europe form developing countries to increase their salaries and further their careers.

## 3 Insecurity for people on the move to Western Europe

It has been estimated that up to 2,000 migrants die each year trying to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa to enter Europe illegally (GCIM, 2005; PICUM, 2006). This is only one of several major routes for irregular migrants entering Western Europe. Another is via the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly Turkey, although there are no estimates for the numbers of people using this route, nor the number who have died there (ICMPD, 2005).

Many irregular migrants who have survived their journey to Western Europe have nevertheless reported being vulnerable during their journey (Koser, 1997). This is particularly the case for victims of migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The means of transport used by migrant smugglers are often unsafe, and migrants who travel in this way may find themselves abandoned by their smuggler and unable to complete the journey they have paid for. Using the services of smugglers, some migrants have been raped and abused during their journey. Some commentators have compared contemporary human trafficking with the slave trade, such are the conditions in which people are moved and then later exploited.

There is a growing consensus that a significant proportion of asylum seekers currently arriving in Western Europe are

smuggled there. One source of evidence is a host of albeit small-scale empirical case studies conducted among asylum seekers over the past decade, all of which have found a majority of respondents to have been smuggled (Gilbert and Koser, 2003; Morrison, 1998, 2000; Nadig and Morrison, 2003; Robinson and Segrott, 2002). Support for their conclusions is provided by analysis of the changing political context for asylum in Europe, where restrictive asylum policies have combined with a lack of formal resettlement programmes effectively to deny asylum seekers a legal route of entry (Koser, 2000). Arguably, still further evidence is provided by growing public acknowledgement on the part of policy-makers and governments of the link between asylum and migrant smuggling (e.g. Morrison, 2000; Salt and Hogarth, 2000).

A final example of insecurity for people on the move to Western Europe is in transit countries. In 2005, the problem of transit migration attracted particular attention in the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta in Morocco. Eleven migrants from sub-Saharan Africa died trying to enter the enclaves, and hundreds more were housed in temporary camps. Human rights violations were reported against migrants being deported from the enclaves back to Morocco, and both Spanish and Moroccan border patrols were accused of using excessive force (Human Rights Watch, 2005). It is likely that there are many more people in transit to Western Europe, for example in Turkey, the Balkans and Eastern Europe, about whose circumstances very little is known.

## 4 Insecurity for migrants in destination societies in Western Europe

It is not just the process of moving in an irregular fashion that can jeopardize migrants, but also irregular status in destination societies in Western Europe. The death of twenty-one Chinese migrants while picking cockles in Morecambe Bay (UK) in 2004 was a particularly vivid illustration that migrants with

irregular status often work in precarious and dangerous jobs. They and their families are generally excluded from health, education and other social welfare provisions, and they can be subject to exploitation in the housing market.

Women are thought to constitute a substantial proportion of irregular migrants in Western Europe. Because they are confronted with gender-based discrimination, female migrants with irregular status are often obliged to accept the most menial informal sector jobs. The majority of migrant domestic workers and migrants employed in the sex industry are women and are at particular risk of abuse. The latter in particular also face specific health-related risks, including exposure to HIV/AIDS.

Migrants with irregular status are often unwilling to seek redress from authorities because they fear arrest and deportation. As a result, they do not always make use of public services to which they are entitled, for example emergency health care. In most countries in Western Europe, they are also barred from using the full range of services available to citizens and migrants with regular status. In such situations, already hard-pressed NGOs, religious bodies and other civil society institutions are obliged to provide assistance to migrants with irregular status.

A category that has attracted particular attention in recent years has been irregular migrants and asylum seekers who are detained. This practice is now widespread across Western Europe (Schuster, 2004). One area of concern for commentators is the length of time people are detained. In the UK there is currently no time limit, in France it is thirty-two days, in Italy sixty days and in Germany six months. Other common concerns are that people who have not actually committed a crime nevertheless are deprived of their liberty, without charges being pressed, without trial, without a right to an automatic bail hearing, often without adequate legal representation, and without being informed of their rights (Schuster, 2004).

Concerns are also regularly raised about the practice of dispersing around the country asylum seekers once they have

arrived. It is common practice in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Republic of Ireland (Boswell, 2003). Several recent studies have highlighted the negative consequences of such policies: they result in competition for already scarce resources in economically and socially deprived areas, they are associated with an increase in racism and racist attacks, and they result in the marginalization and isolation of asylum seekers (Robinson et al., 2003).

Another policy that has been suggested to sometimes undermine the human security of migrants is the deportation of irregular migrants and unsuccessful asylum seekers. Sometimes the act of deportation is inhumane and degrading – people being deported from Germany and Finland in recent years have been sedated, and deportees in the UK are regularly handcuffed. In addition, there are occasional reports of individual deportees being arrested, imprisoned and even tortured and killed after being returned to their country of origin.

Besides migrants in these specific circumstances, many others experience common problems. In most Western European countries unemployment is particularly high among certain migrant groups. Xenophobia, racism and discrimination appear to be increasing across the region, particularly targeted at migrants from Islamic countries. Many migrants are also reported to suffer psychological distress through separation from their families.

## 5 Insecurity for members of destination societies in Western Europe

International migration challenges the exercise of state sovereignty, especially in the case of irregular migration where states cannot exercise complete control over who enters and remains on their territory. According to the so-called Copenhagen School, immigration can represent a threat to national identity and to 'societal security' (Wæver et al., 1993), challenging nation-

state ideals such as social cohesion and the welfare state philosophy (Fitzgerald, 2000, pp. 34–60).

Where it involves corruption and organized crime, international migration can become a threat to public security. In rare cases, irregular migration has also been associated with terrorism. When migration results in competition for scarce jobs, it can also generate xenophobic sentiments that are directed not only at recent migrants, but also at established migrants, refugees and ethnic minorities. The integration of new migrants poses significant challenges associated with accommodating increasing religious, cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. International migration can be associated with particular health risks. Especially when it takes place on a significant scale, and when it receives a great deal of media attention, it can also undermine public confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of a state's immigration and citizenship policies.

Such concerns are found in destination states throughout the world and deserve to be taken seriously. There are circumstances where the human security of host populations can be affected, directly or indirectly, by immigration. The negative implications of migration for host states and societies are, however, probably less significant in Western Europe than in many other regions where, for example, there is mass immigration combined with significant population growth, high levels of unemployment and weak political structures.

Many commentators believe that in Western Europe in particular the potentially negative implications of international migration have been exaggerated. One reason is the focus on irregular migrants. Yet the political significance of irregular migration far outweighs its numerical significance – most migrants in Europe arrive, live and work legally. What is more, irregular migrants are often imputed with the worst of intentions without any substantiation. Two particularly frequent assumptions are that they participate in illegal activities and that they are associated with the spread of infectious diseases, and

especially HIV/AIDS. Both these assumptions are gross generalizations. Some irregular migrants are criminals and some carry infectious diseases; but most do not. Misrepresenting the evidence criminalizes and demonizes all irregular migrants. It can encourage them to remain underground, and diverts attention from those irregular migrants who actually are criminals and should be prosecuted, and those who are sick and should be treated.

At the same time, the potentially positive implications of international migration for destination states and societies in Western Europe are often underestimated. There is extensive academic literature that demonstrates that immigration has contributed towards economic growth across the region ever since the Second World War. Immigration may be one element of a wider solution to the so-called demographic crisis in several Western European countries. Although difficult to quantify, most commentators would agree that immigration has enriched Western European societies and cultures too.

## 6 International migration in Western Europe

The preceding analysis indicates that there are regional specificities about the interaction between human security and international migration in Western Europe.

(1) With the exception of small numbers of people dispersed within countries after their arrival, human security intersects most obviously with international and not EU internal migration.

(2) International migration to which human security issues pertain originates from outside the region – migration between Western European countries is not of direct concern in this context.

(3) Human insecurity is not a cause of migration from the region, although it has been relatively recently. Human insecurity is a cause for a considerable proportion of international migration into the region.

(4) Human insecurity can be a consequence of migration for people on the move to the region as well as after they have arrived.

(5) Particular categories of migrant – including refugees, asylum seekers, irregular migrants and the victims of migrant smuggling and human trafficking – are especially affected. Women migrants are also particularly at risk.

(6) In general, migration does not have an impact on human security for members of destination societies in Western Europe.

Although an examination of the interaction between human security and international migration in other industrialized parts of the world might identify certain overlaps with some of these features, it is likely that together they comprise a configuration that is specific to Western Europe.

What are the implications of this analysis for understanding the concept of human security? One is that human security is a concept that has relevance not only in the developing world. First, there are significant global disparities in human security – international migration is broadly a manifestation of these differences. Second, there is plenty of empirical evidence for very serious insecurity experienced by some migrants in Western Europe. Third, at least in part, insecurity arises for these migrants as a result of policies and processes in Western Europe, not elsewhere.

A related implication is that human security, while a broad and rather abstract concept, is firmly grounded in contemporary political, economic and social systems. In Western Europe, irregular migration is largely a response to a lack of regular migration opportunities in the region, while irregular work is essentially a manifestation of the incoherence of national labour markets. Similarly, exclusion, marginalization and discrimination are reflections of economic and social circumstances in destination countries.

A third implication is that the concept of universal human security clashes with the prerogatives of state sovereignty. By exercising their right to control their borders and who enters and remains on their territory, states are protecting human security for their own citizens. In so doing, however, they can turn away people who are trying to escape insecurity, and at times can enhance the insecurity of those migrants by diverting them into irregular migration channels. The human security of citizens is privileged above the human security of non-citizens. Similarly, the human security of authorized migrants is privileged above that of irregular migrants.

This situation emphasizes the importance of a legal and normative framework for protecting the rights and security of all migrants. While such a framework exists for asylum seekers and refugees, it does not yet for other migrants.

# V

# Cultural identity

Most people derive security from their membership in a group – a family, a community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group that can provide, as the UNDP 1994 *Human Development Report* puts it, a 'cultural identity and a reassuring set of values'. Communities can also be highly oppressive, the report affirms, both for their members and for outsiders, especially in the form of ethnic conflict; and many traditional forms of community 'are breaking down under the steady process of modernization' (UNDP, 1994, p. 31). This dimension of human security seems largely forgotten since 1994, perhaps paralleling the career of the study (sociology, anthropology) of religion in the expectation of the demise of the subject-matter in the age of 'secular modernity'. Even the post-9/11 situation of rising ethnic and religious tensions – with the 'war on terror' increasingly fought on domestic European soil – has not led to a revaluation of the cultural dimensions of human security.

## 1 Security of identity

Security of identity is sought in the human attempt to make sense of this world and the place of individuals and groups in it, in relation to family, community, society and the wider cosmos through meaning and processes of signification. The quest for cultural security can be linked with and expressed through issues of national, ethnic, gender and religious identity as ways in which people create collective meanings, traditionally within the purview of cultural anthropology. If the concept of human security is to be meaningful, then those dimensions of life

that reflect people's humanity (social, cultural, psychological, existential) can only be left out of the equation at great cost.

Human security is more often defined negatively in terms of threats, risks or violations than for what it might mean in positive terms. Yet one needs to also consider the types of social and cultural needs, anxieties, desires, ambitions and projects that have a bearing on human security. The notions of 'certainty' and 'safety' bear a strong family resemblance to security. At the same time, given the methodological individualism implied in the concept of human security, that is as 'people-centred', with individuals as *subjects* of security, one must also consider how to relate individual experiences to social and cultural phenomena. Already in 1991 Anthony Giddens enriched our sociological thinking in this regard with the concept of 'ontological security' (Giddens, 1991, p. 183) which he related to 'identity' conceived not as a 'thing' but as a largely routine process of identification linking the individual with a group or category.

In spite of the anthropological fascination with ethnicity over the past two decades, other forms of identification matter just as much. Whereas nation, region, locality, community and 'race' are often seen as 'variations on the basic ethnic theme of collective identification stressing perceived cultural differentiation' (Jenkins, 2001, p. 8), other identifications may follow class, gender or religious lines. There, too, the distinctions and connections between security, certainty and safety are more difficult to clarify and it is often assumed that people seek some degree of certainty in their (class, gender, religious) identity, while simultaneously striving to create some measure of security through their notion of belonging to a particular collective (social category, group, 'community'). This is perhaps brought out best in Bauman's attempt to connect security with the nostalgic notion of the 'ethical community' (as opposed to 'aesthetic community'), consisting of a 'warm circle' of people having durable responsibilities and commitments to one another against the backdrop of 'liquid modernity' (Bauman, 2001). The resurgence

of new, more or less fundamentalist 'ethnic religions'[5] in Western Europe has to be understood against the backdrop of loss of traditional community security. The new ethno-religious beliefs and practices can thus be interpreted as attempts to reinvent community against the backdrop of the fragmentation and atomization that is threatening social cohesion in Western countries. The broader notions of shared humanity, human equality and human rights come up against the 'micropolitical' challenges of ethnic, familial, and personal identity (Jackson, 1998, p. 21). Europeans must balance between the domains which they can control and those they cannot (Knibbe, 2005, p. 3). The emergence of ethno-religious conflicts all over Europe in recent decades can be understood as motivated by attempts to create new religious and quasi-secular certainties and communities that coincide with shifting boundaries of controllable domains in the everyday experience of various groups and populations.

In this sense, creating certainties or securities is not the core activity of human security per se. Rather, it is the negotiation and ascertaining of the boundary between security and insecurity, certainty and uncertainty which is required for some level of existential or cultural security. Individual experiences, historical shifts in the religious imagination, changing socio-economic circumstances, or sudden shocking events like political murders or terrorist attacks may require a renegotiation of this boundary. In the case of the ethno-religious conflicts in Europe, it is the negotiation of the boundaries between national, ethno-religious groups and movements and the identities marked by these boundaries that is of most concern for the question of human security in relation to cultural identities. Identity construction

5 'Ethnic religions' is a reference to immigrant or diasporic groups and their descendants in Western Europe who used to organize around and be denoted in terms of an ethnicized notion of their country of origin, e.g. 'Moroccans' in the Netherlands who within Morocco would mostly be considered 'Amazight/Berber', and who increasingly profile themselves in deterritorialized, religious terms, i.e. as Muslims. Even though Islam is a world religion, the way that these groups profile their identity draws on a complex and changing repertoire of ethnic and religious symbols.

always occurs in interaction with others, inside and outside their own religious, ethnic or peer-group. Within and between these divergent groups, there is a balance of power through which a kind of 'identity politics' is played out, that is, the negotiations about the definition and interpretation of ideas, practices and experiences that constitute a certain identity (Eriksen, 1993).

## 2 The case of the Netherlands

The Netherlands, although a unique case in itself, demonstrates a number of similarities with other cultural settings in Western Europe where tensions between ethnic groups have emerged during the last decade. These tensions stem in part from conditions common to several European countries, in part through the effects of transnational networks and influences particular to the Netherlands. As in many other European states, Dutch cultural identity first became a problem or was questioned on the arrival of migrants, particularly Muslims. It was in this context that negotiation of the boundaries between white Dutch 'native' identities and Dutch-Moroccan Muslims took place. In this new cultural relation, many people experienced the need to express their identities in relation to a presumed or imagined threat, which emerged from an unsuccessful process of integration of migrants.

Like any other identity, Muslim identity distinguishes itself by reference to the experiences, beliefs, practices, symbols, and traditions that constitute 'Islam'. The process of constructing cultural identities in interaction and negotiation with other categories implies a struggle for the definition of the situation, especially when identities are experienced as opposing, as in the case of 'native Dutch' identity and 'Muslim identity'. When a particular identity is profiled and the position of a corresponding group in society becomes more visible, the existing balance of power shifts. This changing balance creates feelings of losing control over one's environment, which is seen as disorderly and

threatening. A struggle to restore the old power balance may then ensue, resulting in a reinforcement of the boundaries between categories in the process of interaction and negotiation about the identities. The consequence of this reinforcement is that people tend to essentialize the nature of their identity which, in turn, implies the essentialization of others' identity and the reifying of boundaries between 'us' and 'them' (Baumann, 2004). The 'others' are excluded and the boundaries between groups are hardened.

This process implies that groups are living apart, which is not always a problem in itself. When identity constructions are opposed, this does not mean that they are not under control. The early twentieth-century Dutch pillarization system was based on the segregation of groups of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and secular liberals and socialists, with fixed, opposed identities and a carefully guarded balance of power, into religious-ideological 'pillars' of society.

Many Moroccan Muslim men came in the 1970s as 'guest workers'. At the end of the 1970s, a substantial number brought their families to the Netherlands. Moroccan men and other labour immigrants of those days relate that they felt very welcomed by the Dutch. As these guest workers were thought to be only temporarily in the Netherlands, they were not seen as a threat to the existing social order or to Dutch identity. In fact, they more or less confirmed the existing social order and Dutch identity because of this aura of 'temporariness' and because of their contribution to the economy. This changed in the 1990s. It became clear that Moroccan guest workers would not leave the country, that they would stay and that their children would grow up there. In the 1990s, a public accommodation of Islam took place by, for example, the building of mosques and Islamic schools. At the same time, studies and media reports pointed to grave problems concerning Moroccan youth: poor results in school, relatively high crime rates, intimidation in public areas and insolence towards (native Dutch) women and homosexuals. Events such as 9/11, the election campaign of the right-wing populist politician Pim

Fortuyn (assassinated in 2002), the short film *Submission*, about the position of women in Islam (by parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali and film director Theo van Gogh) and the assassination of Van Gogh in 2004, all caused huge unrest. They also put young Moroccans in the spotlight as Muslims[6].

First-generation Mediterranean migrant 'guest workers' were ethnically and religiously defined in contrast to 'native' Dutch, but they were thought of as under control and hence non-threatening because they were supposed to stay for only a couple of years. Thus, they did not seem to create the need for a negotiation of the boundary between native and immigrant. The problem of human security in connection with cultural identity concerns the boundary distinguishing categories. Second-generation migrants, who are often Dutch citizens and supposedly 'integrated' into society, blur the boundaries between the groups by profiling their distinct ethnic and religious background. Their presence in society questions the very category of 'Dutchness'. When the boundary is unclear and people fear domination by 'others' in the process of their identity construction, when they fear that others will interfere with or even dictate their identity construction, then questions of security of identity tend to arise. Individuals fear that they are or will no longer be in control of their own environment or their supposed cultural self and that they will be forced to change themselves in ways experienced as contradictory to their cultural 'essence'.

6 Based on results from Ethnobarometer, a programme of social scientists providing independent and research-based reports on levels of racism, xenophobia and ethnic conflict in selected countries of Europe and coordinated by the director of Ethnobarometer, Alessandro Silj. The latest Ethnobarometer project, Europe's Muslim communities – Security and Integration post-11 September, is operational in six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) is responsible for the Dutch part of this Ethnobarometer project, the objective of which was to assess the consequences of the various responses to 11 September and the murder of Van Gogh in November 2004 for both the Muslim communities and European societies at large and, in particular, the relations between Muslim communities and the rest of the population.

## 3 European tolerance?

What characterizes Muslim identity? First, Muslims are not excluded in advance from the Dutch community. To the extent that they adjust to 'our norms and values', they are included. In other words, the incorporation of Muslims into Dutch society depends on criteria that are used by the Dutch, or Europeans, to hold control over the environment and to maintain a degree of certainty over their identity by demanding conformism on the part of Muslims. The problems related to Moroccan youth are for native Dutch people the main reason to want to exclude them from the Dutch community. These are interpreted as an unwillingness to abide by the prevailing norms and values in Dutch society. Secondly, in the eyes of many native Dutch people, it is unclear where the loyalty of Muslim immigrants lies. In other words, it is not so much the terrorist act in itself that counts, but the question of which side of the boundary Muslims situate themselves publicly and privately. This aspect is mainly related to events such as 9/11 and the assassination of Van Gogh. These events triggered the question of loyalty. Furthermore, the presence of Muslims in the public sphere is experienced as a real threat. It is not Islam in itself, but the feared dominance by Islam and the consequences thereof, the perception of its growing influence and of a changing environment that causes these feelings of insecurity.

The main concept used by native Dutch people in their relation to Muslims is *tolerance*. There are clearly nuances across various settings, but for most Dutch and Europeans, 'tolerance' is a popular typical virtue and an essential part of identity. The concept of tolerance is a core element of Dutch identity and a central notion of liberal European cultural heritage. At the same time, research shows that tolerance is a core concept in the negotiations of the boundary between the domains under control and those one cannot control, coinciding with the boundary between native Dutch identity and Muslim identity. It also serves

as a core boundary marker of identity for Europeans towards themselves. Muslims are seen as intolerant towards Europeans while Muslims and other immigrants enjoy all possible fruits of tolerance, at the expense of natives. All the freedoms fought for in the 1960s, such as women's emancipation, liberation from religious constraints, are assumed to be at risk by Muslims who would not agree with these freedoms.

At times, in the search for human security during negotiations about identity, the opposite is evoked. Some feel that tolerance is not fully compatible with Islam, blaming intolerance and xenophobia on others. Protests against large mosques and Islamic schools, the question of 'double nationality', banning the *burqa*, etc., are held responsible for the current tensions in society and for the break-up of tolerance. This means that tolerance is not only part of the core of European identity, but it also marks the boundary between ethnic Europeans and Muslims. This, combined with specific events such as 9/11 and the murder of Van Gogh murder in the Netherlands, and the generally increased visibility of Muslims in the public sphere, leads to a feeling that their existence is uncertain. Some feel that the boundaries protecting their own group and their environment are blurring. Essentializing these boundaries is a way to overcome this threat. It makes clear who the enemy is and what is needed to contain the threat.

Different trends can be seen among Moroccan Muslim youth in the Netherlands. There are those who seek actively to engage with and belong to Dutch society. Their message, however, about a tolerant and peaceful Islam, compatible with Dutch society, is ignored or disbelieved by the Dutch (De Koning and Bartels, 2006). More and more young people call for action against what they perceive as 'a battle against Islam'. Their actions can take various forms, but mostly these are individual acts. In these two trends, people feel threatened, but they realize that their future is in the Netherlands. In order to secure a prosperous future, they have to try to belong. They stand up for their own

Muslim identity, demand respect and are less inclined to accept any form of restriction. They try to negotiate the boundary between their own Muslim identity and Dutch national identity by using the same concept of tolerance. But this concept is transformed. The notion of space for minorities is no longer central. Tolerance is related to the concept of respect. Tolerance and respect are no longer virtues directed at others, but a claim for space for oneself, a way of protecting oneself from the interference of others (De Koning, 2005; Pels, 2003). Tolerance and respect are not only related to what one sees as essential to Islam, but also connected to a kind of universal right to one's own identity and to core values of Dutch society. So the boundary between Dutch and Muslim identity is essentialized by the use of the same concepts, albeit interpreted in different ways.

The concept of tolerance is therefore central in the negotiations to control the boundary between us and them, between security and insecurity. Ultimately, this is a dead end because extreme essentialization causes negotiations to fail, leading to an impasse in the identity politics with negative consequences for the perception of human security.

Given the rapid and rather extreme transition of a public discourse of cultural relativism and tolerance to a discourse emphasizing integration and assimilation and the closing of state borders for migration, the Dutch case exemplifies tendencies towards insecurity present in several countries in Western Europe. This is illustrated by the 2005 riots in the French suburbs as well as the 2006 German discussion about the security of teachers and children in multi-ethnic public schools. These trans-European concerns for cultural security are not only comparable, but also mutually influencing through transnational networks, as events and developments in one country may affects the situation in other countries as well. The recent transnational and international controversy over cartoons published in Denmark is a case in point. Finally, the threat of terror attacks (Madrid, London, political murders in the Netherlands) and the corresponding

public and political responses make clear that the present insecurity over identity issues have a deep impact on people's sense of physical security, thus violating the 'freedom from fear' dimension of human security. In other words, the way that people define their cultural identity is part and parcel of their subjective sense of human security – first and foremost in terms of cultural security, but eventually in terms of their physical safety.

# VI

# Personal liberty

Like tolerance, liberty is a cornerstone of modern European society. However, the post-Cold War political landscape, the pressures of globalization, and the configuration of socio-economic and political conditions are challenging many of the prevalent liberal universalist ideas and principles in today's Europe (Boswell, 2000). Threats from terrorism, the resurgence of ethno-centric nationalism, and other social problems imply, both directly and indirectly, that threats to personal liberties may be considered as one of the main concerns with respect to human security in Western Europe today. Historically, there is evidence of a negative correlation between external and internal threats and the respect for personal liberty. For example, it has been generally accepted that freedom of movement must be restricted in order to protect against pressing threats to security. The possible trade-off between the protection of national security and public order, on the one hand, and the protection of the fundamental human rights of freedom of expression, assembly, and association, on the other, is what justifies the application of the concept of human security to the general question of the present and future security of Europeans and their personal liberties.

## 1 Liberalism and illiberalism

Europeans in general enjoy freedom of opinion and expression. Exercising these rights is considered fundamental and is generally encouraged, both on a personal level, as well as through the media and other channels. Any legal limitations imposed on these rights should follow only from the necessity of

securing *due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others*, as well as national security and public order in a democratic society (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, 1948), as democratic rights can only be assured within civic order (Bird, 2000, p. 408). In most Western European states, racially defamatory, contemptuous or offensive speech is illegal and/or otherwise restricted on the grounds that it constitutes intentional infliction of emotional suffering and is thus a violation of the basic human rights of others. The restriction of racist speech is consistent with the idea that individual freedom must be promoted and asserted within a collective sphere, and that such speech impedes the pluralistic exchange of ideas by alienating individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of race, colour, language, religion, and/or national or social origin (Bird, 2000, p. 406). There are some basic human rights that people want to enjoy regardless of their social, racial, ethnic or religious status. In an increasingly multicultural Europe, with the resurgence of social tensions and far-right movements, many European states are facing increasing challenges in balancing constitutional guarantees of equal liberty and non-discrimination.

The emotions and reactions aroused in Muslim communities in Europe and around the world following the publication of religious caricatures in some European newspapers, is one of the fiercest examples of the new interconnectedness between freedom of expression and human security in an increasingly interdependent world. The exercise of freedom of expression in Europe may have direct security repercussions in terms of internal and external reactions. Hence, while the principle of freedom of expression is irrefutable and at the very heart of democracy, and as such should be defended all over the world, efforts must be made in Europe, on national as well as supranational levels, to promote dialogue among cultures and religions, within as well as beyond its borders. It is essential for the promotion of human security in Europe and elsewhere to

avoid having the principle of freedom of expression stand in opposition to the principle of respect for individual moral and religious convictions. As argued by the Barcelona Report, a human security approach for Europe, in our era of global interdependence, must therefore involve a strong contribution to the protection of every individual. Such an approach cannot be limited merely to the defence of its borders, because Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are insecure (SGESC, 2004, p. 5).

Protecting human security implies providing education and information for all members of society, as well as a public space that brings people of all backgrounds together to foster dialogue and tolerates divergence of opinion. As argued in the final report of the Commission on Human Security, nobody has a monopoly on being right, and the claim of unilateral rights inevitably leads to opposing claims by others. Hence the importance for all multicultural European societies, as a policy of inclusion, to promote freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of information, freedom of conscience and belief, and freedom to organize. These rights empower people by giving them the ability to act democratically on their own behalf, and to demand respect when their dignity is violated (CHS, 2003, pp. 11, 12).

## 2 Personal data

One of the main assets of the European response to threats of terrorism and gross crime violations is the collection, exchange and availability of a growing number of personal data. These data concern different aspects of people's private and public life. The nature of these data ranges from biometrics to behavioural patterns. The policy of increasing data collection is observed at a national level as well as at the EU level. The double set of national and supranational levels also clarifies the nature of the expanding process of exchange and availability of personal data. The declared

goal of such policies is to achieve a 'high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice' as set by Article 29 of the EU Treaty. In particular, since the signing of the Schengen Treaty in 1985, which allows for the abolition of systematic border controls between participating EU countries, a variety of efforts in the domain of police cooperation have been focused on the improvement of data exchange between law enforcement agencies. The amelioration of the data exchange system has been seen as an essential counterweight to a new area of free movement of people. In recent years, the idea of a world of interconnected and transnational threats has accentuated the perceived need for an improved data-exchange system as one of the main tools for achieving the high degree of security through prevention and response. Hence, a growing number of personal data becomes an important method of assuring the security of people. The principle of data availability is a key asset for ensuring efficient data exchange.

However, such security policies also raise a wide range of concerns. The first warning light concerns privacy. Entire populations, citizens, foreigners and (im)migrants, are submitted to a growing intrusion into their private lives. The policies of European states are targeted at creating a generalized surveillance framework. Individual European states and the European Union have agencies committed to the protection of personal data, but they risk being marginalized by the states' political actions and by the increasing amounts and variety of data, as well as the agencies that process these data. Furthermore, this privacy concern also has an extra-European dimension: following the signing of the so-called Passenger Name Record (PNR) accords in May 2005, data on European citizens are transmitted to non-European agencies, within a very weak data-protection framework and with little or no possibility of requesting or ensuring accountability. An extended use of personal data in a generalized surveillance system will affect public life. There is a risk of creating barriers on the processing of such data, as well as a possible discriminatory effect.

The second concern is the process of defining the security threats and of creating policies to respond to these threats. Terrorist attacks are often used as a way to demonstrate the need for powerful tools, such as data collection and transmission. Terrorism, however, is not the only threat countered by such means; serious crime and the control of immigration are other examples.

The definition of a serious crime is increasingly blurred, and the identification of immigration as a threat is more an assumption than a natural fact. The paradoxes of this situation are well highlighted by a human security approach. Europeans (and also non-Europeans) are concerned by policies and policy tools: their private lives are directly affected and their personal liberties are restricted in favour of what is assumed to be a higher level of personal security.

## 3 Financial aspects

Financial surveillance raises the essential question of state interference in private life. State surveillance risks redefining the relation between the individual and the state across the process of traceability, collection and transmission of personal data concerning the whole population. This implies not only an intrusion into people's private lives, but also creates suspicion based on their movement and actions. The concept of human security induces a definition of security that must be incorporated into a continuous process of transformation and enlargement. This approach therefore stresses the importance of taking into consideration non-military issues as well as non-governmental actors. In extending this analysis, it thus becomes essential to treat the economic dimensions and financial aspects of security in relation to personal liberty. Given the mechanisms of regulation, and the control of financial systems and their implications, the connection to personal liberties seems evident. Having first appeared under the aegis of the G7, this system of financial

surveillance emerged at the end of the 1980s and initially focused on the laundering of money from drug trafficking before being extended to include organized and transnational crime, and most recently to include terrorism as an 'umbrella' concept that subsumes a wide array of threats. The renewal of the institutional system to address money laundering has emerged, in the eyes of Western policy-makers, as a framework for developing the fight against terrorism at both national and international levels. The campaign against money laundering has thus been extended to target terrorism more specifically because disrupting and destroying the finances of terrorist organizations is considered as an important weapon in the fight against terrorism.

The measures used to combat the financing of terrorism rest upon a foundation of surveillance and criminal investigation. Applying these measures in a 'global war on terror' in Western Europe affects the operation of a wide range of businesses beyond the banking community and has spill-over effects for the financial lives of citizens and non-citizens alike. These include the use of financial data by police agencies against activities other than terrorism or money laundering; the use of risk analysis by the financial industry to sort potential customers by risk level; and the suppression of informal financial activities utilized by migrant labour. This increased surveillance focused on the financial transactions of European citizens and non-citizens is not without consequences for personal liberty and the right to privacy. It affects individuals in a variety of ways, from the opening and maintaining of a bank account, to transferring money between accounts and across borders, to securing a home mortgage, even to deciding which charity to support. The insertion of terrorist financing into the global anti-money laundering regime extends the financial monitoring in order to include legitimate funds which may potentially be used to support terrorism. The European Union insists on the necessity of reinforcing customer due diligence measures and would like to target charities or non-profit organizations, but the inclusion of legal funds in the

financial surveillance makes this surveillance more complex for financial institutions (banks, etc.) to establish a well-founded suspicion. The result highlights the risk of reporting suspicions on innocent customers in the name of the fight against terrorism. Beyond the question of personal data retention, the problem is not so much the nature of the information required, but rather the recent increase in the amount of information requested, its use and the role of the banker transmitting it.

# VII

# Political security

In order to evaluate political security, we must try to explain why and how the political dimensions of human security have been naturalized in European political practice in such a way that political security is, with only a few exceptions, taken for granted, either as an achievement (civil-military relations, democracy, human rights) or as an obvious goal (democracy promotion and consolidation in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe).

Two linked aspects of political security need to be examined: (1) the evolving separation of the internal and external security functions of the state; and (2) the subordination of armed force to civil authority. By highlighting the political foundations of the conception of human security promoted by European states (which includes both 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' elements), attention can be drawn to the way in which the promotion of human security is the outward projection of domestic political practices that are often unreflectively transposed to radically different contexts. It also serves to highlight the historically contingent nature of human security in Europe, by noting how relatively recent some of the acquis of human security in Europe really are[7], and how they are linked to a Weberian understanding of the state as an institution that enjoys the legitimate monopoly over the use of force.

7 *Acquis communautaire*: a French term meaning 'the EU as it is', i.e. the rights and obligations that EU countries share. The *acquis* includes all EU treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by the Court of Justice. It also includes action that EU governments take together in justice and home affairs and on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

## 1 Human security and political security

For the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, political security means that 'people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights'. This somewhat vague formulation does not specify what it means for a 'society' to honour basic rights, and what role state institutions have in safeguarding them. But included under this heading is also the idea that military governments and countries experiencing political unrest are not likely to be politically secure; nor are those in which there were high levels of military spending, since 'governments sometimes use armies to repress their own people', This focus on military spending might appear somewhat unusual, but makes sense given the context of the 1994 report, which attempted to influence the debate leading up to the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit. From this perspective, political security *is* human security, given that the primary responsibility of political institutions to maintain the social order is a precondition for human security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 32–33).

Placed in a broader historical (and philosophical) context, the notion of *political* security tackles two issues that have been central to the liberal tradition (and its challengers): the reciprocal rights and duties that individuals owe to one another; and the nature and scope of the sovereign institutions designed to safeguard these rights and duties. In short, political security is about the state, and, more specifically, about the relationship between citizens, and between citizens and the state.

If we look at political security – as the question of the nature of the relationship between citizens and their states and as a sort of lens for interrogating state *institutions* – then this way of thinking about political security is quite close to the narrow understanding of human security as 'freedom from fear'. It is based on the idea that political security – indeed politics and political debate – cannot flourish without first evacuating the threat of force and violence from public space. This is true,

arguably, for all political, social and economic interactions, as where the threat of force and violence is omnipresent, society cannot flourish, politics cannot be democratic and representative, and markets cannot function.

## 2 Domestic policing and security

The separation of the internal from the external security functions of the state, and the idea that the state *provides* security and is responsible for guaranteeing public order through 'policing', rather than representing a source of insecurity (and violence) for the population, was relatively slow to take root in Western Europe.

Policing must be regarded as a key element of any conception of human security, for at least two reasons. First, the police represent the security institution that most individuals are likely to encounter directly in their lives. Second, the provision of security to individuals and communities was a central part of the bargain that provided legitimacy to the modern state, and justified the outward orientation of its own security policies and practices.

Contemporary policing has traditionally focused on domestic security, and in a liberal democratic state, a sharp distinction has been made between the institutions, practices and laws governing domestic and international order. Despite the general trend towards a sharp separation between military and police forces, in many places in early modern European history there was no clear distinction between the means that states used to provide external or internal security. In France, for example, the gendarme was modelled on the soldier, with military discipline, equipment and organization. In the German Länder, the *hatschiere* police and hussars (light troops) were often decommissioned soldiers, who could be recalled to serve in wartime. In England in the early 1700s, state control was exercised in part by the army, the militia and the constables. All

three institutions were weak and unreliable: the constables were susceptible to being overwhelmed by organized criminal bands, the militia was locally recruited and hence an 'uncertain support for legal order' and the army was an organization of last resort, although 'last resort' was not an infrequent result.

The provision of public order was also a dual-edged sword, one that highlighted the tensions in the relationship between states and their citizens. The means used to protect the people were also often used to protect the regime (or elites) *from* the people, since the suppression of violence from other organized groups did not eliminate large-scale disorganized violence, directed against the state and its officials, from erupting periodically. Most often these eruptions of violence were catalysed by the perceived venality or corruption of state officials, or from the exploitation and repression of class-driven social orders. In most cases, the army was used when deemed necessary to suppress unrest, alongside the less forceful and more traditional institutions.

Diverse as these developments were, the main point is that they involved the centralization of security structures (policing) within the state, an extension of state power and surveillance throughout a given territory, and a growing distinction between the institutions of internal security and those responsible for external security.

Only as the notion of the national community became more deeply entrenched did the boundaries between external and internal start to coincide with formal legal frontiers. And only as the practical and legal reach of the state converged did the distinction between the institutions for guaranteeing internal and external security emerge clearly. Once a certain threshold had been crossed, the domestic use of the institutions of organized violence designed to ensure external security – the use of the army to break up strikes for example – became regarded as justified only *in extremis*. Human security, understood here as freedom from everyday violence, was provided for by institutions that were

politically controlled, and widely (but not universally) legitimate. Achieving this aspect of political security in Europe involved a centralization of security structures (policing) within the state, an extension of state power and surveillance throughout a given territory, and a growing distinction between the institutions of internal security and those responsible for external security. A clear link can be made between the rise of the responsibility of the state to provide public order and security, the growing legitimacy of political institutions, and the spread of democratic and representative rule.

### 3 Subordination of armed force to civil authority

A parallel and related phenomenon has been the slow subordination of the external instruments of security – the armed forces – to civilian control and oversight. At the outset, the army served as the tool of princes, and soldiers were mere mercenaries serving the narrow political or strategic interests of nascent state-builders. As Charles Tilly argues, early modern states in Europe were born as war-making machines, and their focus on raising funds to expand and consolidate territory meant that the state elites' relationships with the population were confined to extraction, taxation and predation – not qualitatively different than recently witnessed in contemporary warlord politics in countries such as Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia (Tilly, 1992).

The relationship between citizens and the army began to change in the eighteenth century, in particular with the mass mobilization that characterized the Napoleonic wars. One result, as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz perceptibly noted in the nineteenth century, was that states and state elites that wished to mobilize the masses had to do so not just in the name of *raison d'état*, but in the name of the nation – *la patrie*. This move marked the first step on the long road to the democratic control of armed forces. The importance of such a development for political security in Europe cannot be

underestimated, for without civilian oversight, the belief (and the experience) was that the armed forces, like any other instrument of organized violence, represented a potent reservoir of power that could be used for narrow sectarian interests, to suppress unrest, or even simply to subjugate a population. It also, and not incidentally, consumed a huge proportion of state revenues, revenues that were increasingly raised from forms of taxation that touched the population directly.

In the second half of the twentieth century, debate took a more democratic turn, as ministries of war became departments of defence, as parliamentary control was expanded beyond budgetary matters to include oversight of policy, procurement, staffing and other important issues. Even the business of strategy itself – especially nuclear strategy – was increasingly seen as too important to leave to the generals. Historically, this is a very striking development: the idea that people with no direct experience of a particular phenomenon, war in this case, were the best placed to plan strategies such as nuclear deterrence that implicated the risk of violence at unthinkable levels. Despite the different aspects and chronologies, the move to increase civilian surveillance over the institutions of organized violence in all cases revolved around the idea that the risk of war, or the incidence of the use of force, or the amount of financial resources devoted to the armed forces would be diminished through civilian surveillance and control, and that these benefits would increase the political (and, not incidentally, human) security of individuals and communities.

Although perhaps distant, there are three kinds of challenge on the horizon that should at least stop us from being too complacent about the European *acquis* of political security, concerning both of the dimensions outlined above. The first is the rise of the private provision of security, accompanied in many cases by a relative or perceived decline in the ability of state institutions to provide adequate public order and security. This can be seen in the dramatic expansion of private security

companies, operating across a wide range of sectors in society. Although in itself unproblematic, this development means that, for many, security stops being seen as a public good. When the state does not assume responsibility for providing security for all, then those who can afford to purchase security on the open market live in gated communities or in buildings with security guards, and work in urban areas that are effectively insulated from violence, while the rest of the population fends for itself, living in relative fear and insecurity.

Second is the growing challenge to the states' practical monopoly of the use of force, demonstrated by the easy availability of the instruments of violence – guns (including high powered or military-style weapons, explosives, and other weapons of terror) in civilian hands. Although this too should not be exaggerated, bombings in Madrid and London, as well as other forms of violence, can create a climate of fear that exerts significant pressure on political and public debate, and often results in (or can result in) specific challenges to political or civil liberties.

Finally, the deterritorialization of threats – exemplified by the 'war on terror' – calls into question the neat division between the institutions that states use to combat external threats – armies – and those for public order and domestic security. Security institutions are stretched in both senses, with the military and intelligence institutions expanding into the domestic sphere, with all the potential consequences for human rights and civil liberties, and police functions are expanding outwards, with all the questions this raises about oversight and accountability. Of course, this globalization of threats and insecurity also ought to highlight the links between the measures taken to provide political security in Western Europe (and elsewhere), and the creation or attenuation of threats elsewhere.

## Conclusion

Insecurity is something other than danger. Where an attention to human safety may seek to keep individuals clear from imminent danger, human security has a different aim. Where protection from danger preserves us from known and understood sources of harm, protection from insecurity involves something far more diffuse and speculative, something more human. Human security manifests far deeper links to the humanity of what concerns us, to our fears and wants, our hopes and ambitions, and our feelings of anxiety and trepidation at leading a life free from fear. In this special sense, human security as an analytic concept has a unique contribution to make in understanding Western Europe. Where one might argue that human security is a concept minted for application to the developing world, this report responds that, having vanquished the basic challenges of physical survival, the European system of public welfare must now turn to adequately addressing the growing human insecurity of Western Europeans.

This fact is perhaps the *least* innovative among the discoveries of the present report. Indeed, it harkens back to a Marxian analysis of base and superstructure, according to which all higher institutional activities build upon the basic economic functions of a society. Nonetheless, it is a crucial reminder that a certain version of democracy, of equality, of diversity, is not yet attained in Western Europe. In a number of developing regions of the world, these values are not yet institutionalized because of economic conditions, environmental crisis or armed conflict. In Western Europe they represent the expected baseline.

Recommendations for achieving better human security will vary in kind and degree according to the subfield covered in the report. Insecurities originating in *socio-economic vulnerability* are already the object of social policy in individual Member States and in EU social policy at large. The data systematized from the European Social Survey in the present report is thus already an indication of where more effort and focus is needed and where effort is presently either unnecessary or ineffective. Social and economic policy contributes to human security and insecurity, yet cannot exhaustively assure it (or fail it). Socio-economic security is fundamental for the individual to confront life in European society, a basis for reducing vulnerability, and for dealing with the social risks inherent in the European risk society.

Similarly, *health security* cannot simply be improved by improving health, though clearly good health makes one more resilient to unseen threats to health. Insecurity associated with individual health is also clearly related to a globalized world of new and transportable illnesses. Insecurity stems from awareness of looming illness, infection and epidemic. Such threats are again inseparable from processes of *environmental* change, *socio-economics*, and globalization. In terms of policy, health-related vulnerabilities must be confronted on all levels, personal, national, European and global. The politics of socio-economics is the starting point. From city to region to country, access to health services varies. Such access is the direct consequence of policy decisions and should be improved considerably within the EU. On the threat side of health security, a new spate of illnesses occupies the consciousness of Europeans (Europeans are in fact more preoccupied with the security of their food than with any other security issue). Food-borne illness, the unknowns of genetic modification, avian influenza, contribute to both a sense of vulnerability and to a factual vulnerability. Moreover, the explosive spread of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa again links health security to questions of migration.

The links from health security to *environmental security* are already clear. Approaches to the environment require global coordination, at all levels. For questions of large-scale pollution, international cooperation is the only possible route. At the local level, coordination is needed in order to assure an adequately clean water supply and for concerns related to agricultural production and food processing. These are classic health and environmental issues, which in aggregate contribute to insecurity.

Insecurity stemming from *migration* issues has two distinct dimensions. The *direct* experience of migration as a migrant can carry an enormous burden of insecurity. Those who migrate face a spectrum of unknowns, threatening and non-threatening, along their journey. Protecting the individual security of migrants begins by insisting that their basic rights, even as illegals, be protected if arrested and put in state custody. The *indirect* experience of migration as a member of the receiving community involves a different order of insecurity. Foreign migrants represent a threat, real or imagined, to cultural traditions that individuals experience as their own. In this case, the notion of cultural identity becomes central. Most individuals find a certain kind of security in the identity they hold in a cultural and social setting. That identity is conceived as unchanging and for the most part heterogeneous. While the notion of unchanging cultural homogeneity is demonstrably imaginary, the prospect of change or hybrid culture is unsettling, even destabilizing for many. *Cultural identity* in its affirming and negative modes thus becomes a central concern for the feelings of security of individuals. The response to the cultural threat is knowledge, awareness of culture, and awareness of oneself in that culture.

Finally, on the most general level of security and insecurity in Western Europe, lie the political notions of *personal and political liberty*. Although these notions are perhaps the most theorized and canonized in our study, it is essential that they be revitalized as key measures of the well-being of individuals in society. The dominant cause of changes in norms surrounding

personal liberty is the encroaching illiberalism linked to the global 'war on terror'. Political liberty of the kind assured in the tradition of the liberal state is in this context presented as a trade-off against security. The equation is simple: in order to be secure, society must sacrifice a certain number of political and personal liberties assured by the liberal state. This calculation of security touches the human security of individuals. It needs to be addressed with a critical eye. Some dangers are real, and some liberties do provide fertile ground for their exploitation. Here more than elsewhere, however, it is essential to reiterate the distinction made repeatedly in this report between danger and insecurity. Vulnerability is the exposure to the *possibility* of harm or suffering. However, the notion of possibility, as we know, is the product of those who know how to evaluate threat. More than any other field in our time, the science of threat is politicized. Thus human insecurity in the domain of personal and political liberty is now more and more forcefully modulated by politics.

With the question of personal and political liberty, human security thus comes full circle. Traditionally, ensuring personal and political liberties belongs to the domain of the state, institutionalized in law and government. The institutions of the state are the accepted guarantors of freedom of action, movement, of democratic rights, etc. These are customarily considered as the foundation of the well-being of citizens of the state. And yet a well-studied consequence of globalization and late modernity is an increasing *porosity* of the state.

Human security, as we have argued above, and demonstrated throughout the report, is not merely a state of well-being, shaped by a determinate set of parameters. And, by the same token, no one is served by the kind of prolonged discussion that seeks a consensus as to what those parameters are. Human security, we have found, is a kind of knowledge about society.

The response to this challenge must, as elsewhere, be one of lucidity: human security as an analytic, and thus political, tool. Political *because* analytical. In itself human security has no

normative status. It is rather the answer to the question: what relieves individuals of fear, what liberates them from duress. The answer is obviously culturally contingent, context dependent, fixed in a social field, implicitly linked to a moral environment. These dimensions vary from place to place, from era to era. Their variability grants the notion of human security with meaning in Western Europe just as it does elsewhere.

Human security is not a relativism because there are standard benchmarks for the quality of human life, engrained in the central documents of human rights and international law. However, human security does indeed vary in relation to such benchmarks. Indeed, it is the very *meaning* of human progress to raise civilization relative to these benchmarks to make obsolete or unthinkable those types of suffering which in a previous era systematically gave rise to vulnerability and precariousness.

The most general and wide-ranging recommendation that emerges from this study must be to politicize the interrelation of core elements of vulnerability in Western Europe. One must not only open social complexities to interdisciplinary analysis, but ensure that political decision-making takes into account the interdependencies of human insecurity. As might be expected, insecurity in one domain feeds insecurity in others. The most general set of causal links stems from socio-economic insecurity, which spreads vulnerability and precariousness to all aspects of life, from health, to liberty, to political voice.

Personal liberty thus turns out to be an essential ingredient in the conceptualization of human security in Western Europe. This new approach to security must no longer only be considered as a foreign policy tool. It must also become a (truly) European question, adequately focused on the region's inhabitants. While referring to the fundamental principles defined in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, the conceptualization of human security in a Western European context evidently deserves and requires a specific definition in order to be pertinent and applicable. Any such definition must stress regional criteria

specific to Europe, criteria that are likely to differ substantially compared with those of other regions.

It is from the dynamics of this contextual adjustment of the concept of Human Security that the emphasis on personal liberty derives its meaning. The fear generated by the 9/11 attacks and other terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere may facilitate the propagation of socio-political tensions and the implementation of liberally constraining measures. In this context, the human security approach must permit the reaffirmation of the indivisible and irreducible nature of certain fundamental rights and liberties. Personal liberty is an integrated part of these liberties. Freedom of expression and information, and the right to privacy, are all central elements whose defence contributes to the respect of human rights and human dignity.

In Western Europe, the political and social environment is interconnected and consists of many levels. This brings with it potentially positive and negative aspects. For example, empowerment and accountability could suffer, as states may potentially be able to exploit the European Union framework to pass laws unpopular at home, and thus bypass domestic democratic scrutiny, and/or otherwise diminish certain fundamental liberties. This in turn entails a problem of transparency and accountability in the formulation and implementation of policies.

A broad human security approach contributes to redefining the assumption of an 'outside versus inside' dimension of security policies. We can see two principal movements and tendencies concerning this point: the first is the European Union integration in itself. For a wide range of domains, including security, the integration process implies a progressive abandoning of the distinction between the national and supranational base of policy-making and policy-implementation. The second tendency is the recognition of an interconnected world with interconnected threats. The approach of human security broadens the concept of security and emphasizes first and foremost the monitoring and

maintaining of human rights everywhere as a basis of security for everyone. In this context, security for Europeans can therefore only be achieved by promoting rights-based and universal freedoms for Europeans and non-Europeans alike.

If there is to be a human security agenda it must therefore be one of knowledge production, knowledge to be put to the service of political processes whose means and ends are not the object of the doctrine. Indeed, the strengthening of the research-policy nexus, as promoted by UNESCO at the International Forum on the Social Science – Policy Nexus (Buenos Aires, Argentina, February 2006), in the field of human security, is essential today. Furthermore, human security does not articulate the right to human security. This family of rights is already laid down in the central documents of this and the preceding century. Rather, it makes a demand to those who do not see the world in the light of a new security problem.

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# Appendices

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# Final Recommendations

First International Meeting of Directors
of Peace Research and Training Institutions

on the theme

*What Agenda for Human Security*
*in the Twenty-first Century?**

1. Human security can be considered today as a *paradigm in the making*, for ensuring both a *better knowledge* of the rapidly evolving large-scale risks and threats that can have a major impact on individuals and populations, and a strengthened *mobilization* of the wide array of actors actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields it encompasses today.

As such, it is an adequate framework for:

• accelerating the transition from past restrictive notions of security, tending to identify it solely with defence issues, to a much more comprehensive multidimensional concept of security, based on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles;

• contributing to sustainable development and especially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of all human rights;

• reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife that are taking a heavy toll on mainly civilian populations in all regions of the world without exception;

* UNESCO, Paris, 27-28 November 2000.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001405/140553E.pdf

• providing a unifying theme for multilateral action to the benefit of the populations most affected by partial and interrelated insecurities. The importance should be underlined of the multilateral initiatives taken in this respect by Canada and Japan as well as by other countries.

2. The ongoing globalization process offers new opportunities for the *strengthening of large coalitions working to further human security, at the multilateral and national levels, and in particular at local level involving all actors of society*. This in turn requires a much stronger participation of peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other bodies dedicated to the promotion of peace and human security, with a view to enhancing the involvement of civil society in all aspects of policy formulation and implementation of actions aimed at enhancing human security at the local, national, regional and international levels.

3. The promotion of human security today therefore requires an *enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices and initiatives* in the fields of research, training, mobilization and policy formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of proactive human security initiatives, in particular in the framework of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum website launched in September 2000 for that purpose (http://www.unesco.org/securipax).

4. *The strengthening of the action of the United Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in favour of human security is essential today*, taking into account the objectives set out in the UN Millennium Summit Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, and the Declaration and Plan for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as on the measures

being taken to reach internationally agreed development targets, in particular in the fields of poverty eradication; education for all; the preservation of the environment and notably of water resources; and the struggle against AIDS.

5. The compounded impact of a growing number of threats to the security of populations requires the establishment of *innovative interdisciplinary approaches geared to the requirements of inducing participative preventive action, involving all social actors*. The intimate links that should exist between research projects and policy formulation in the field of prevention must also be stressed from the outset, taking into account the fact that current research on various dimensions of security is still largely dissociated from the existing policy formulation mechanisms, particularly at the national and subregional levels. On the basis of a common agenda for action, the peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies and the NGOs working in related fields can play an essential role in creating these links, building bridges between the academic world and the policy formulation mechanisms, contributing to the establishment of such mechanisms wherever necessary, identifying priority fields to be tackled and the populations that merit particular and urgent attention.

6. *Regional and subregional approaches* should be elaborated for the promotion of human security in order to more precisely identify the nature, scope and impact of the risks and threats that can affect populations in the medium and long term. UNESCO should contribute to the elaboration of these regional and subregional approaches, in cooperation with national and regional organizations and institutions and on the basis of the regional round tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean) held during the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a real threat to peace and security, as stated by the United Nations Security Council.

7. Special attention should be paid to the *most highly populated countries*, given the fact that in these countries the interrelationship between population growth, diminishing natural resources, environmental degradation and the overall impact of ongoing globalization processes is of great complexity and must consequently be dealt with, in particular in terms of designing local approaches focusing on specific population groups.

8. *The development of human resources is a key factor, if not the most important, for ensuring human security*. Basic education for all and the building of capacities at the national level must therefore be placed high on the human security agenda. Institutes for peace and human security can play an important role in national capacity building in fields such as the setting up of early-warning mechanisms related to major risks and threats to human security; and high-level training for the elaboration of regional and subregional long-term approaches for ensuring human security and the formulation of preventive action policies.

9. Critical post-conflict issues such as *reconciliation processes and mechanisms and the often harsh impact of sanctions on populations* merit more in-depth analysis in terms of human security, in the framework of an enhanced respect for international instruments, in particular of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concerning reconciliation processes and mechanisms, due attention should be paid to the adequate dissemination of best experiences and practices and to the comparative analysis of these experiences and practices, especially of the work of the various truth and justice commissions set up in last two decades in various countries. Concerning the impact of sanctions on populations, note should be taken of ongoing initiatives within the United Nations in order to review the modalities of the imposition of such sanctions and the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate their impact on civilian populations.

10. The impact on human security of *migrations* and of movements of *populations displaced due to conflict* should be highlighted. Concerning migrations, attention should be paid to countering practices in host countries that discriminate against legal immigrants, and in the case of populations displaced due to conflict, the efforts of the international community should be reinforced, especially when the displacements take on a semi-permanent character.

11. Due attention should be paid to countering the impact of *negative paradigms* (such as 'clash of civilizations', 'African anarchy', etc.), based on stereotypes and simplistic analyses of the interactions between cultures, societies and civilizations and which aim at fostering new divisions and fractures at the international and regional levels. The principles underlying the notions of cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination should be stressed and due attention should be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action of the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001).

12. *The role of the state* in the promotion of human security must be addressed on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of challenges in matters relating to human security, both from within to ensure sustainable development, and from the rapidly evolving international processes linked to economic and financial globalization. States should be encouraged to establish ways of enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in particular with those NGOs and institutions that can contribute effectively to policy formulation and collaborative action in the field.

# Some UNESCO publications on Human Security, Peace and Conflict Prevention

*Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Eastern Europe,* UNESCO, 2007

*Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Central Asia, UNESCO, 2006*
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http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001106/110639fo.pdf

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